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BEYOND THE GUANTÁNAMO BIND:
PRAGMATIC MULTILATERALISM IN
REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT

Melissa J. Durkee*
I. INTRODUCTION
“One of my clients is Huzaifa Parhat. He’s never been
charged with anything. He never will be. In fact, he’s been
cleared for release for years. Two weeks ago he began his
seventh year at Guantánamo.”
—Sabin Willett, testifying in 2008 before the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on
International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight

A group of detainees remains in the detention facility at the
U.S. naval station in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba (“Guantánamo”) almost
a decade after the facility began to hold suspected combatants
arrested in connection with the U.S. conflict in Afghanistan. As U.S.
officials have acknowledged, in many cases these supposed
combatants turned out to have no connection to al Qaeda or
terrorism. Many were foreigners who had fled home countries to
escape persecution and lived as undocumented aliens in Afghanistan
or Pakistan. When the United States began its military campaign in
Afghanistan and offered bounties for the arrest of terrorists, the
foreigners were swept up and handed over. The United States
unwittingly became the custodian of a population of refugees in
*
Associate, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP. Yale Law School J.D.,
2004. The Author represents a detainee who obtained release from Guantánamo
and acquittal of all charges in Algeria. Conversations with other Guantánamo
habeas lawyers about the subjects of this paper led to many valuable insights.
Particular thanks are due to Susan Akram, Wells Dixon, Zachary Katznelson,
Joseph Landau, Tanisha Massie, Christopher Moore, John Sifton, and Doris
Tennant. Thanks also to Lindsay Barenz, Oona Hathaway, Catherine Hardee,
Mars Saxman, and Bela August Walker for helpful comments on earlier drafts,
and to Cleary Gottlieb for generous pro bono and research support.
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Guantánamo: detainees who fear return to home states with
documented histories of human rights abuses such as Algeria, Libya,
Syria, China, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.1
The unwitting imprisonment of refugee detainees placed the
U.S. executive in a bind: It could either repatriate the detainees to
home states where they would face persecution or torture—which
would be illegal, morally repugnant, and politically consequential—
or resettle them in the United States—which Congress has
prohibited and which would ignite a political firestorm. Rather than
choosing either unfortunate option, the executive has engaged in a
difficult, secretive, and politically charged process through which it
peddles refugee detainees for resettlement to potential host countries
around the world. While the executive has been able to resettle a
number of the refugee detainees, several dozen still remain at
Guantánamo in early 2011, almost a decade after the detention
center opened.2
This Article asserts that the U.S. approach to resettlement of
Guantánamo’s detainee refugees is fundamentally flawed. By
exploiting loopholes to defend detention and exclude the refugee
detainees from protection under domestic and international refugee
law, the United States sacrifices the moral goods at the heart of those
laws. Moreover, the United States undercuts its own political goals
by alarming and alienating the foreign states on whose help it
depends, making the approach ultimately ineffective at
1.
Not all of the remaining detainees in Guantánamo are refugees. Of the
172 who remain at the time of publication, 91 have been cleared for release. Of
those who have not been cleared, 34 will be tried in federal court or by military
commission, 45 will not be tried but remain in limbo in Guantánamo, one is
serving a life sentence, and one is awaiting sentence after accepting a plea
bargain. Of the 91 cleared for release, 58 are Yemenis who cannot currently
return to Yemen because the executive issued a moratorium on all transfers to
Yemen after news that the attacker who attempted the 2009 Christmas Day
plane bombing was recruited in Yemen. See Andy Worthington, Introducing the
Definitive List of the Remaining Prisoners in Guantánamo, Cageprisoners,
Sept. 14, 2010, http://www.cageprisoners.com/our-work/opinion-editorial/item/
560-introducing-the-definitive-list-of-the-remaining-prisoners-in-guantanamo;
The Guantanamo Docket, N.Y. Times, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo?
scp=4&sq=guantanamo&st=cse (last visited Mar. 9, 2011). While it is likely that
the remaining 33 detainees are refugees, the exact number of refugees cannot be
determined because the U.S. has not offered the detainees any procedures by
which they may demonstrate refugee status. See infra Part III.A.1.ii. This Article
addresses only those detainees who are cleared for release and who are or may be
refugees.
2.
See sources cited supra note 1.
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accomplishing U.S. ends. Setting aside the question of whether the
United States could be coerced or incentivized to deal with
Guantánamo’s refugee detainees in an ideal manner, this Article
proposes a third way between full compliance with domestic and
international law and the current U.S. approach. The United States
should request assistance from the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”), the organization responsible
for supervising and coordinating international refugee protection
under conventions to which the United States is a party.3 The Article
further asserts that it is within the UNHCR’s mandate to assume
responsibility for resettling the refugee detainees and that UNHCR
facilitation would solve many of the legal, moral, and political
problems of the current U.S. approach.
UNHCR facilitation would not threaten U.S. sovereignty
interests, because the UNHCR is structurally predisposed to behave
deferentially to the states it assists. A UNHCR-facilitated
resettlement approach would rely primarily on existing state
commitments to the UNHCR rather than on U.S. political clout,
smoothing and speeding the process by decoupling resettlement
agreements from approval for U.S. policies. This would safeguard
detainees from return to persecution or torture and facilitate quicker
release, enabling the United States to honor commitments to close
the detention center.
U.S. policy with respect to the Guantánamo refugees mirrors
a global trend toward the erosion of international refugee law by
states weary of the domestic political costs of rising asylum claims.4
Global preoccupation with national security has exacerbated this

3.
See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) [hereinafter Refugee Convention];
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606
U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967) [hereinafter Protocol]. The Protocol
is an independent legal instrument that incorporates the Refugee Convention by
reference. The United States is a party only to the Protocol, but has assumed
Refugee Convention obligations by virtue of its accession to the Protocol. See
Arthur C. Helton, The Mandate of U.S. Courts to Protect Aliens and Refugees
Under International Human Rights Law, 100 Yale L.J. 2335, 2340 (1991).
4.
See, e.g., James C. Hathaway & R. Alexander Neve, Making
International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for Collectivized and
Solution-Oriented Protection, 10 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 115, 143–44 (1997) (declaring
that “international refugee law is in crisis”); Joan Fitzpatrick, Temporary
Protection of Refugees: Elements of a Formalized Regime, 94 Am. J. Int’l L. 279,
291–92 (2000) [hereinafter Temporary Protection] (citing developed states’
increased pressures regarding the asylum system).
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trend. 5 States avoid classes of refugee claims or sidestep specific
refugee problems in the way the United States models in
Guantánamo: by exploiting loopholes or evading refugee law
altogether. Thus, the UNHCR-brokered solution proposed in this
Article will be relevant in other contexts. This pragmatic
multilateralism allows reluctant sovereigns to serve national
interests while also shoring up the international refugee protection
system. For contexts like Guantánamo, where states are tempted to
skirt international law to avoid responsibility for a politically delicate
refugee problem, a UNHCR-brokered solution will benefit the
refugees and the states involved. It will also keep those states from
codifying in domestic law broad exceptions to international refugee
law, or narrow interpretations of it, both of which threaten to erode
those international norms.6
Part II of this Article describes the factors at play in
Guantánamo’s refugee detainee problem: the identity of the
detainees, U.S. resettlement policies, and the challenge of
resettlement in practice. Part III critiques the current resettlement
process on legal, moral, and political grounds. Part IV proposes a
UNHCR-brokered resettlement process, and addresses anticipated
critiques of such an approach. Part V situates this proposal in the
larger debate regarding state circumvention of refugee convention
requirements.

II. GUANTÁNAMO’S REFUGEE DETAINEES
The U.S. executive established the detention facility in
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba in 2002 after the terrorist attacks of
5.
See generally Mario-Florentino Cuellar, The Limits of the Limits of
Idealism: Rethinking American Refugee Policy in an Insecure World, 1 Harv. L. &
Pol’y Rev. 401 (2007) (criticizing this trend); Geo. Human Rights Inst.,
Unintended Consequences: Refugee Victims of the War on Terror, 37 Geo. J. Int’l
L. 759 (2006) (same); see also Ratna Kapur, Travel Plans: Border Crossings and
the Rights of Transnational Migrants, 18 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 107, 134 (2005)
(arguing that the war on terror has inspired a fear of the “other” in asylum
policies); Bemma Donkoh, A Half-Century of International Refugee Protection:
Who’s Responsible, What’s Ahead, 18 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 260, 264 (2000)
(discussing how concern for national security has led governments to “unleash a
series of stern measures and sanctions to deter and punish any type of irregular
entry”).
6.
See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, The “Haiti Paradigm” in United States
Human Rights Policy, 103 Yale L.J. 2391, 2424–25 (1994) (discussing the
implications of these narrow interpretations and broad exceptions in human
rights policy).
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September 11th and the initiation of the U.S.-led “war on terrorism.”7
The facility was meant for use in detaining and interrogating enemy
combatants.8 However, many of the Guantánamo detainees were
swept up in error, arrested while fleeing the chaos after the U.S.
bombing campaign in Afghanistan, or seized and turned over to U.S.
forces by bounty hunters.9 These men had little or no information of
value to U.S. intelligence, and the United States quickly began
to designate them “cleared for release.”10 Many detainees have
languished in Guantánamo for years after being cleared, however,
waiting for the United States to make arrangements to transfer them
elsewhere. One group of cleared detainees has faced a
particularly long and uncertain delay: those who fear mistreatment
if they are returned to their countries of citizenship.
Several dozen of these “refugee detainees” 11 still remain in
7.
See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 466–67 (2004) (describing the history of
the detention center).
8.
See id.; Donald H. Rumsfeld, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Department
of Defense News Briefing with Secretary Rumsfeld & General
Pace, June 14, 2005, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2005/tr20050614secdef3042.html (“The detention facility at Guantánamo Bay was established for
the simple reason that the United States needed a safe and secure location to
detain and interrogate enemy combatants.”).
9.
See Tim Golden & Don Van Natta, Jr., U.S. Said to Overstate Value of
Guantánamo Detainees, N.Y. Times, June 21, 2004, at A1 (reporting on
interviews with “dozens of high-level military, intelligence and law-enforcement
officials in the United States, Europe and the Middle East” and stating that
according to those officials “many of the accused terrorists appeared to
be . . . innocent men swept up in the chaos of the war”).
10. See id. (reporting that according to dozens of high-level military officials,
only a handful of Guantánamo detainees were able to provide intelligence to aid
terrorism investigations). Note that some of the remaining detainees in
Guantánamo have been charged and will face trial. Transfer issues relating to
those detainees are beyond the scope of this Article, which addresses only the
refugee detainees who have been cleared for release. See infra Part II.B.1.
11. A “refugee” is someone outside his country of citizenship, or a stateless
person outside his country of habitual residence who has a “well-founded fear of
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion.” Refugee Convention, supra note 3, at
1(A); see also infra Part III.A.1.a. For purposes of this Article, the term “refugee”
is used to refer both to a person who has been designated a “refugee” and a
person who has not been so designated but would likely meet the definition if a
refugee status determination were to be conducted. This approach is consistent
with the position held by the UNHCR and international law scholars who
generally understand that recognition of refugee status is declaratory, not
constitutive. See UNHCR, Handbook On Procedure And Criteria For Determining
Refugee Status, para. 28 (1979), available at http://www.unhcr.org/
3d58e13b4.html [hereinafter Handbook]; Helton, supra note 3, at 2342–43
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Guantánamo in 2011.12
Resettling the refugee detainees has been one of the
significant obstacles to the U.S. executive’s plan to close the facility.13
The executive has expressed a commitment not to return detainees to
countries where they fear persecution or torture, but the United
States will not accept any detainees for resettlement in U.S.
territory.14 Third countries have been reluctant to accept them.15 In
the meantime, the detainees remain imprisoned in Guantánamo
without any guarantees that they will not be released back
to persecution at the hands of their home states. 16 For some, the
prospect of such a release is worse than the prospect of remaining
indefinitely in Guantánamo.17

A. Who Are They?
Many refugee detainees in Guantánamo share a common
story: Long before they were taken into U.S. custody, they left their
countries of citizenship due to fear of persecution.18 They traveled in
search of refuge and found their way to Pakistan or Afghanistan
because it was possible to make a home in those countries as

(asserting that a person claiming to flee persecution is protected by refugee law
even before a receiving country grants formal refugee status).
12. Peter Finn, Most Detainees Low-Level Fighters; Guantanamo Report
Task Force Advises 126 be Transferred, Wash. Post, May 29, 2010, at A03
[hereinafter Low-Level Fighters]; see also sources cited supra note 1.
13. Immediately after his inauguration in January 2009, President Obama
signed an Executive Order announcing an intention to close the detention facility
within a year. Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009),
available at http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E91893.pdf [hereinafter
Executive Order].
14. See infra Parts II.B.2 and II.B.3.
15. See infra Part II.C.
16. See Emergency Motion for Administrative Stay Pending Resolution of
Petitioner’s Emergency Motion of March 7, 2010, on the Merits at 2, Belbacha v.
Obama, 706 F. Supp. 2d 120 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 05-2349) [hereinafter Belbacha
Motion] (stating that the government would not disclose whether it intended to
transfer a detainee to a country where he fears persecution or torture).
17. See id.
18. See Center for Constitutional Rights, Frequently Asked Questions:
International Protection for Guantánamo Prisoners who Cannot be Safely
Repatriated, http://ccrjustice.org/learn-more/faqs/resettlement-and-refugeesGuantánamo (last visited Mar. 9, 2011) [hereinafter Center for Constitutional
Rights, FAQs].
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foreigners without obtaining official papers.19 Then, when the United
States began its military campaign in Afghanistan, it offered large
bounties to anyone who could hand over “anyone suspected of having
ties to al-Qaida.”20 Many of the people arrested and turned over to
the United States were foreigners to Pakistan or Afghanistan who, as
the CIA has acknowledged, were simply “in the wrong place at the
wrong time.”21
The Uighurs are perhaps the most famous of Guantánamo’s
refugee-detainees. The Uighurs are a group of Chinese citizens who
are members of a Turkic Muslim minority from the Xinjiang province
in far west China.22 Sometime before September 11, 2001, the
Uighurs left China and traveled to the Tora Bora Mountains in
Afghanistan, where they settled in a camp with others of their ethnic
group.23 The Uighurs then fled to Pakistan when U.S. aerial strikes
destroyed the Tora Bora camp. 24 Arab travelers promised to take
them to a safe house in Pakistan, but instead turned them over to
19. See Interview with Mustafa Ahmed Hamlily, Algerian Detainee, in
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba (Sept. 8, 2007) (on file with Author) [hereinafter Hamlily
Interview] (recounting how Hamlily and several family members fled Algeria in
1989 to escape persecution by the Algerian government in Algeria and, after
unsuccessfully attempting to obtain residency in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, finally
made a home near Peshawar, Pakistan because it was possible to reside in the
region in relative peace without official identity papers); see also Center for
Constitutional Rights, FAQs, supra note 18.
20. See Hamlily Interview, supra note 19; see also Center for Constitutional
Rights, FAQs, supra note 18 (reporting that 86 percent of the detainees at
Guantánamo were turned over to the United States by individuals in Pakistan or
Afghanistan at a time when the United States was offering a considerable bounty
for the handover of anyone suspected of connection with al-Qaida or terrorism).
The United States distributed leaflets promising “wealth and power beyond your
dreams,” and “millions of dollars for helping the anti-Taliban force catch al-Qaida
and Taliban murderers.” Id. The pamphlets promised that the bounties would be
“enough money to take care of your family, your village, your tribe for the rest of
your life.” Id.
21. Golden & Van Natta, supra note 9; see also City on the Hill or Prison on
the Bay? The Mistakes of Guantánamo and the Decline of America’s Image, Part
II Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Org., Human Rights and Oversight of the H.
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 1 (2008) (testimony of Sabin Willett,
Partner, Bingham McCutchen LLP) (stating that interrogators informed his
client soon after he arrived at Guantánamo that his capture was a mistake);
Hamlily Interview, supra note 19 (reporting that Hamlily’s interrogators told him
that his arrest was by mistake and that he should be released).
22. See Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 837 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see also
Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
23. See Parhat, 532 F.3d at 837; see also Kiyemba, 555 F.3d at 1024.
24. See Parhat, 532 F.3d at 837–38.
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Pakistani authorities who, in turn, handed them over to the
United States, reportedly for large bounties.25 Eventually they were
transferred to Guantánamo and detained as enemy combatants.26
Evidence produced at hearings in Guantánamo indicated that
at least some Uighurs intended to fight the Chinese government and
that they had received firearms training at the camp for this
purpose.27 Attorneys for the Uighurs argued that they could not be
repatriated to China or any country that would render them to China
“because their avowed separatism would likely result in torture or
worse.”28 In a proceeding before the D.C. Circuit, the Court agreed
that the Uighurs have a legitimate “fear that if they are returned to
China they will face arrest, torture or execution,” and concluded,
with notable understatement, that “[r]eleasing petitioners to their
country of origin poses a problem.”29
Another group of detainees who fear persecution if they are
returned to their countries of origin is made up of Algerians who fled
persecution at the hands of the Algerian government or Islamist
rebel groups around the time of the Algerian civil war.30 One such
refugee detainee made a home near Peshawar, Pakistan, married
and raised a family.31 When arrested by Pakistani police and turned
over to the United States, the detainee had been living in the region

25. See Human Rights Watch, Q&A: Resettlement of Guantánamo Bay
Detainees, Feb. 23, 2009, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/02/23/q-resettlementGuantánamo-bay-detainees [hereinafter Human Rights Watch, Q&A].
26. See Parhat, 532 F.3d at 837–38.
27. See id. at 838, 843.
28. Brief of Petitioners at 4, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (No.
08-1234) (stating that the parties agree on this point and citing State Department
reports and Department of Defense news transcripts and related news reports);
see also Parhat, 532 F.3d at 838 (finding the parties to be in agreement that the
Uighurs would face torture or execution upon return to China).
29. Kiyemba, 555 F.3d at 1024. In Kiyemba, the D.C. Circuit reversed a
district court ruling that the Uighurs be released into the United States. Id. The
Court held that only the executive branch—and not the courts—has the authority
to admit the Uighurs into the United States. See id. at 1038–39. The Supreme
Court in turn reversed the D.C. Circuit ruling on the ground that the factual
circumstances inspiring the grant of certiorari had changed. See Kiyemba v.
Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235, 1235 (2010). On remand, the D.C. Circuit found that no
further proceedings were necessary in light of the changed factual circumstances
and reinstated its prior opinion. On April 18, 2011, the Supreme Court
denied certiorari. 563 U.S. ___ (2011). For a discussion of these cases, see infra
Part III.A.
30. See Hamlily Interview, supra note 19.
31. Id.
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with his wife and five children for nearly a decade.32 Other Algerians
have similar stories.33 Many of these Algerians are afraid to return to
their home country. 34 State Department and news reports suggest
that these fears are credible, as political strife in Algeria has
reportedly claimed as many as 200,000 lives since 2002.35 According
to human rights groups, the government has employed violent
tactics, including torture, to suppress an Islamist insurgency.36 The
State Department’s report on human rights practices in Algeria in
2009 noted that “local human rights lawyers maintained that torture
continued to occur in detention facilities, most often against those
arrested on ‘security grounds.’” 37 After expressing concerns about
returning to Algeria, one Guantánamo detainee was tried in absentia
and sentenced to twenty years in prison. 38 Another immediately
32. Id.
33. See id. (describing biographical details about a fellow Algerian
detainee).
34. See Peter Finn, Six Detainees Would Rather Stay At Guantánamo Bay
Than Be Returned To Algeria, Wash. Post, July 10, 2010, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/09/AR201007090
4926.html?nav=emailpage&sid=ST2010070905128 [herinafter Six Detainees];
Editorial, Six Algerian Detainees Don’t Want To Go Home, Wash. Post,
July 16, 2010, at A18 (reporting that six Algerian detainees have attempted to
block their release from Guantánamo out of fear that in Algeria they would face
“abuse, torture or worse at the hands of the government or militant Islamic
groups”).
35. See U.S. Department of State, 2009 Human Rights Report: Algeria (Mar.
11, 2011), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/nea/136065.htm
[hereinafter State Report: Algeria]; see also Six Detainees, supra note 34 (citing
State Department reports).
36. See supra note 35; see also Algerian Troops Begin Major Kabylie
Operation, Magharebia, July 22, 2010, http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xh
tml1/en_GB/news/awi/newsbriefs/general/2010/07/22/newsbrief-02 (reporting that
Algerian soldiers launched a large operation in the south of Algeria “following
several terrorist attacks on security services in the region”).
37. State Report: Algeria, supra note 35.
38. See Six Detainees, supra note 34 (reporting that Ahmed Belbacha was
sentenced in absentia to 20 years in prison by an Algerian court in 2009 for
alleged association with an illegal armed group). Belbacha is represented by
Reprieve, a British human rights organization, which described the events of the
conviction as follows:
Ahmed’s fears about Algeria were confirmed by an alarming
“conviction” delivered in absentia by an Algerian court in
November 2009. In a disgraceful show trial, where no lawyer
was appointed to defend Ahmed, the court sentenced him to 20
years in prison for belonging to an “overseas terrorist group.”
Despite repeated requests and extensive investigation,
Reprieve’s lawyers have been unable to discover what exactly
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disappeared after being returned to Algeria against his will. 39 In
early reports, the government denied any wrongdoing, claiming to
know nothing about what had happened to the detainee.40
When President Obama took office, approximately sixty
refugee detainees remained in Guantánamo; they hail from Algeria,
Azerbaijan, China, Egypt, Libya, Palestine, Russia, Syria, Tajikistan,
Tunisia, and Uzbekistan.41 By early 2011, 33 remained.42

B. U.S. Resettlement Policies
1. “Cleared for Release”
The refugee detainees considered in this Article all have been
cleared for release by the administration or ordered released by a
court. Both the Bush and Obama administrations have cleared
detainees for release over the life cycle of the detention facility, and
recently U.S. courts have also ordered release after granting habeas
corpus petitions brought by detainees.43
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
executive could detain individuals in Guantánamo so long as those
individuals were enemy combatants.44 Following this ruling, the
United States convened Combatant Status Review Tribunals
(“CSRTs”) to review the file of every detainee and, in all but a few
Ahmed is supposed to have done. No evidence has been
produced to support his “conviction,” which appears to be
retaliation against Ahmed for speaking out about the
inhumane treatment he would be subjected to if sent to
Algeria.
Reprieve, Ahmed Belbacha, http://www.reprieve.org.uk/ahmedbelbacha (last
visited Mar. 9, 2011).
39. See Lamine Chikhi, Christian Lowe & Jon Hemming, Algeria Denies
Detaining Guantánamo Returnee, Reuters, July 22, 2010, http://af.reuters.com/
article/worldNews/idAFTRE66L1V120100722.
40. See id.
41. See Center for Constitutional Rights, FAQs, supra note 18.
42. See supra note 1.
43. See infra and supra notes 41–51 and accompanying text.
44. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (plurality opinion of
O’Connor, J.). In Hamdi, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, pursuant to
Congress’s authorization for the use of force, the military could detain in
Guantánamo “enemy combatants,” who fought against the United States in
Afghanistan. The Court held that such detention “for the duration of the
particular conflict in which they were captured, is so fundamental and accepted
an incident to war as to be an exercise of the ‘necessary and appropriate force’
Congress has authorized the President to use.” Id.
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early instances, designate the detainees “enemy combatants.” 45
Although the U.S. executive never removed the enemy combatant
designation, over time it signaled its understanding that there was
no reason to continue to detain many of the detainees. 46 Rather,
under the Bush administration, the executive’s practice was to note
in each detainee’s file after a review by an Administrative Review
Board (“ARB”) that the detainee was “cleared for release.”47 In

45. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 734 (2008) (noting that the
CSRT process was designed to comply with the due process requirements
identified in Hamdi); U.S. Department of Defense, Guantánamo Bay Processes
(Oct. 2, 2007), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2004/d20040818
GTMODetProc.doc [hereinafter Processes] (explaining that the CSRT hearings
were instituted as a “formal review of all the information related to a detainee to
determine whether each person meets the criteria to be designated as an enemy
combatant” and defining “enemy combatant” as “an individual who was part of or
supporting Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces that are engaged in
hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, [including] any
person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities
in aid of enemy armed forces”); Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 837–38 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (relying upon the definition of “enemy combatant” provided in the Order
Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal and holding that evidence
before the CSRT was insufficient to sustain its determination that the detainee
was in fact an “enemy combatant”); see also The Guantanamo Docket, N.Y.
Times, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo?scp=4&sq=guantanamo&st=cse
(last visited Mar. 9, 2011) (providing Combatant Status Review Board reports
stating enemy combatant status for all detainees in Guantánamo).
46. Id. (listing Guantánamo detainee “combatants” who have been
transferred out of Guantánamo for detention in other countries).
47. After the CSRT panel made its determination as to each detainee, the
Department of Defense conducted regular ARB hearings for all detainees
designated as enemy combatants. Press Release, U.S. Department of Defense,
Defense Department Conducts First Administrative Review Board
(Dec. 14, 2004), http://www.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=8068
[hereinafter Press Release]. The ARB process was meant to “annually assess
whether an enemy combatant continues to pose a threat to the United States or
its allies, or whether there are other factors bearing upon the need for continued
detention.” Id. According to the ARB implementing instructions:
In every case it reviews, an ARB shall make a recommendation
to the [Designated Civilian Official] to:
(1) Release the enemy combatant without limitations
to his home State or a third State as appropriate;
(2) Transfer the enemy combatant to his home State
(or a third State as appropriate) with conditions
agreed upon between that State and the United
States; or
(3) Continue to detain the enemy combatant in U.S.
control.
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practice, the “cleared for release” designation has had little or no
relationship to the timing of a detainee’s actual release.48 Under the
Bush administration, some detainees were held in Guantánamo for
many years after being cleared for release.49 For example, most of the
original group of 22 Uighurs had been cleared for release by 2004,
and yet none were released until 2009. Some remain in detention.50
Under the Obama administration, the old ARB system was
dissolved and the administration convened a task force to re-review
the detainee files.51 Obama’s task force again concluded that many
detainees should be released, but did not immediately release any
after making this designation.52 After a chain of cases regarding the
detainees made their way to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court
ultimately determined that detainees have the right to bring habeas
corpus petitions in U.S. courts, and thereby challenge the lawfulness

U.S. Department of Defense, Memorandum Regarding Implementation of
Administrative Review Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S.
Naval Base Guantánamo Bay, Cuba (Sept. 14, 2004), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2004/d20040914adminreview.pdf
[hereinafter ARB Memo].
48. Human Rights Watch, Q&A, supra note 25. This is despite the fact that
the Defense Department clearly anticipated that a detainee’s “cleared” status
would be the first step in a process culminating in release. According to a Defense
Department Memorandum explaining the ARB process, it was intended, among
other things, to “help ensure no one is detained any longer than is warranted.”
Processes, supra note 45. To this end, the ARB made its recommendation
regarding release or transfer to a Designated Civilian Official (“DCO”) who was to
“make[] the final decision whether to release, transfer or continue to detain the
individual.” Press Release, supra note 47. However, Defense Department
materials established no protocol governing what to do with a detainee who had
been “cleared for release” by an ARB and ordered released by the DCO but who
was not in fact released. See ARB Memo, supra note 47. By contrast, the
procedure for detainees who had not been “cleared” was well-defined: a new date
would be scheduled for a further hearing by the ARB panel and the detainee
would remain in the custody of the Defense Department until that date. Id.
49. Human Rights Watch, Q&A, supra note 25.
50. See id.; Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(recognizing that administrative and diplomatic difficulties have resulted in the
continued detention of detainees cleared for release).
51. Low-Level Fighters, supra note 12.
52. See id. The Washington Post reports that when President Obama took
office, of the 240 detainees remaining in Guantánamo, 59 detainees had been
cleared for release by ARB panels. The Obama administration task force
increased that number to 126 of the 240 detainees, and also recommended that 30
more detainees be released if security conditions in their home countries
improved. Id.
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of their detentions. 53 Many of the detainees who remain in
Guantánamo have availed themselves of this opportunity, and been
successful. 54 When successful, the detainees have obtained rulings
from Article III courts that mandate their release from
Guantánamo.55 Yet many of these successful detainees remained in
Guantánamo long after a court demanded their release; at the time
of publication, 12 of the 38 men who won their habeas petitions are
still being held.56

53. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008) (holding that
Guantánamo detainee petitioners “may invoke the fundamental procedural
protections of habeas corpus”); see also Joseph Landau, Muscular Procedure:
Conditional Deference in the Executive Detention Cases, 84 Wash. L. Rev. 661,
673–75 (2009) (describing the detention rulings and executive responses that
eventually led to the Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene).
54. See Brief of Petitioners at 20, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010)
(No. 08-1234) (stating that by early 2010 courts had ruled in 39 habeas cases and
that in all but eight of the cases the courts held that the detainees were
not enemy combatants); see also The Guantanamo Docket, N.Y.
Times, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo?scp=4&sq=guantanamo&st=cse
(last visited Mar. 9, 2011) (providing release information for all Guantánamo
detainees); Center for Constitutional Rights, Guantánamo Habeas Decision
Scorecard, http://ccrjustice.org/learn-more/faqs/Guantánamo-bay-habeas-decisionscorecard (last visited Mar. 9, 2011) [hereinafter Scorecard] (providing an
overview of habeas case outcomes for Guantánamo detainees and archiving court
opinions granting or denying habeas).
55. Rather than ordering the executive to release the detainees in the
United States, the courts issued what have come to be referred to as “Kiyemba
orders,” directing the government to engage in diplomacy to try to arrange the
prisoner’s transfer abroad. See Brief of Petitioners at 20, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130
S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (No. 08-1234).
56. See id. (reviewing instances where detainees remained in Guantánamo
long after winning habeas cases); see also Richard Bernstein, A Detainee Freed,
But
Not
Released,
N.Y. Times,
Sept.
23,
2009,
available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/24/us/24iht-letter.html
(“Saber
Lahmar
celebrated the anniversary of his habeas win in Guantánamo.”); Excerpts from
rulings in Guantánamo Bay Cases, Assoc. Press, Nov. 15, 2009,
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/politics/2010278991_apusguantanamojudg
esexcerpts.html (summarizing post-writ history of Guantánamo habeas cases);
Andy Worthington, Introducing the Definitive List of the Remaining Prisoners in
Guantánamo, Cageprisoners, Sept. 14, 2010, http://www.cageprisoners.com/ourwork/opinion-editorial/item/560-introducing-the-definitive-list-of-the-remainingprisoners-in-guantanamo.
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2. Release to Persecution or Torture?
It is U.S. policy not to transfer individuals to countries where
they will be subjected to torture. 57 In Kiyemba v. Obama, the
government affirmed before the Supreme Court that “[t]he United
States assesses humane treatment concerns in determining
destinations for detainees at Guantánamo Bay, and follows a policy
of not repatriating or transferring a detainee to a country where he
more likely than not would be tortured.”58 However, the government
does not disclose in every case whether it considers this policy
applicable, so a detainee and his counsel may not know whether the
U.S. considers the detainee’s transfer to his home country to be a
transfer to torture.59 Moreover, the government has not extended
this policy to situations in which a detainee fears mistreatment
upon return that would not rise to the level of torture, but
would nevertheless entitle a detainee to “refugee” status under
international standards.60

3. Release to the United States?
Although the executive branch has determined that many
Guantánamo detainees are eligible for release, and has committed
not to return detainees to torture, it has not exercised its discretion
to accept the detainees for resettlement on U.S. soil.61
57. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 702 (2008) (“[T]he Solicitor General
states that it is the policy of the United States not to transfer an individual in
circumstances where torture is likely to result.”) (emphasis in original); Kiyemba
v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“United States policy is not to
transfer individuals to countries where they will be subject to mistreatment.”);
see also Margaret Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition
and the Rule of Law, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1333, 1375–76 (2007) (“Curiously,
although the United States has argued repeatedly that its non-refoulement
obligations do not apply outside its territory, it has also stated that it implements
the rule as a matter of policy in relation to anyone within U.S. custody.”)
(emphasis in original). Satterthwaite argues that the Bush administration used
this statement of “policy” as a shield to obfuscate its practice of transferring
individuals to countries where they are at risk of torture. Id. at 1376.
58. See Brief of Respondents at 6, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010)
(No. 08-1234).
59. See Belbacha Motion, supra note 16.
60. For a discussion of the international standards governing the definition
of a “refugee,” see infra Part III.A.1.
61. See, e.g., Kiyemba, 555 F.3d at 1026 (stating that with respect to the
Uighur petitioners, “the Executive Branch has determined not to allow them to
enter the United States”); Telephone interview with a Habeas Attorney (who does
not wish to be identified to protect the safety of her client) (May 17, 2010)
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The judiciary has refused to force the executive’s hand. In
Kiyemba, the D.C. Circuit held that habeas corpus jurisdiction does
not entitle the judiciary to order the government to bring
Guantánamo detainees to the United States and release them.62 The
Supreme Court vacated and remanded the D.C. Circuit opinion
without reaching the substantive merits, on the grounds that the
factual circumstances inspiring the grant of certiorari had changed:
Each detainee petitioner had received an offer of resettlement in
a foreign country, and so “release into the United States [was not]
the only possible effective remedy.” 63 On remand, the D.C. Circuit
found that no further proceedings were necessary in light of the
changed factual circumstances and reinstated its prior opinion. On
April 18, 2011, the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Even if the executive were to choose to bring the refugeedetainees to the United States, Congress has prohibited this. In June
2009, after the Obama administration proposed to resettle some of
the Uighurs in Virginia, a political storm ensued.64 Congress stapled
[hereinafter Habeas Attorney Interview] (stating that her client’s asylum petition
in the United States was rejected on the ground of extraterritoriality).
62. See Kiyemba, 555 F.3d at 1029. The D.C. Circuit found that the
executive has “the inherent right to exclude or admit foreigners and to prescribe
applicable terms and conditions for their exclusion or admission.” Id. at 1025
(citing, among others, Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892); Harisiades
v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 596 (1952)). Unless some statute provides
otherwise, it is not “within the province of any court” to review the executive’s
political decision to exclude particular aliens. Id. at 1026 (quoting United States
ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950)). Finding no statute
circumscribing the executive’s discretion to exclude the Guantánamo detainees
from U.S. soil, and noting that the Immigration and Nationality Act does not
treat Guantánamo as part of the United States, the Court concluded that the
detainees are not within United States territory and so are not eligible for
admission under the immigration laws as refugees or asylum seekers. Id. at 1031
(stating that the detainees are not eligible for admission because they have never
“entered or attempted to enter the country” or applied for admission under the
immigration laws). The Court ultimately held that the federal courts have “no
power to require anything more” from the executive in the context of
Guantánamo detainees than a representation that the executive “is continuing
diplomatic attempts to find an appropriate country willing to admit” them. Id. at
1029.
63. Kiyemba, 130 S. Ct. at 1235.
64. See Brief of Petitioners at 13, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010)
(No. 08-1234) (“Political opposition to this plan was swift and highly charged, and
the President shelved it.”) (citing Massimo Calabresi & Michael Weisskopf, The
Fall of Greg Craig, Time, Nov. 19, 2009, at 34; Michael Isikoff & Mark Hosenball,
Next Stop Nowhere, Newsweek, May 23, 2009, http://www.newsweek.com/2009/
05/22/next-stop-nowhere.html; Peter Finn & Sandhya Somashekhar, Obama
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a rider to a “must-pass” defense-funding bill, the Supplemental
Appropriations Act of June 2009, prohibiting release of detainees into
the United States.65 Specifically, the bill barred the use of defense
funding to release into the United States anyone detained at
Guantánamo on the date of the bill’s enactment. 66 The June bill
expired in October 2009, but was replaced by the Department of
Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2010 67 and the National
Defense Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 2010.68 Each of these
acts bars the agencies in question from spending funds to facilitate
release in the United States of detainees or aliens who were present
in Guantánamo on a specified day.69 Congress’ control of the purse
strings functionally blocks the executive from transferring the
refugee detainees to the United States.70

C. United States Practice: “A Huge Problem and a Complicated
One”
The tension between the United States’ commitment not to
return refugee detainees to countries where they will be tortured and
its refusal or inability to accept these detainees for asylum in the
United States has produced a long and arduous resettlement process.
With a high level of secrecy under both Presidents Bush and Obama,
the executive has approached other countries to attempt to find
countries willing to accept the asylum-seeking refugee detainees.71 In
Bows on Settling Detainees; Administration Gives Up on Bringing Cleared
Inmates to U.S., Officials Say, Wash. Post, June 12, 2009, at A1).
65. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 111-32, 123 Stat. 1859, add. 1a (2009)).
66. Id.
67. Pub. L. No. 111-83, 123 Stat. 2142.
68. Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190.
69. Brief of Petitioners at 13, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010)
(No. 08-1234).
70. See Andrew Taylor, Senate Votes to Block Funds for Guantánamo
Closure, Assoc. Press, May 20, 2009, http://www.webcitation.org/5jPWyaCDq.
While the executive could conceivably solicit funds from private sources, doing so
would be in bold defiance of Congress.
71. The Bush Administration was ambiguous about this for years, publicly
litigating while privately encouraging allies to resettle the Uighurs. See Brief of
Petitioners at 3, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (No. 08-1234) (citing
classified declarations). The process has been somewhat more transparent under
President Obama with the public appointment of a Special Envoy charged with
detainee resettlement. See, e.g., Jon Manel, U.S. Envoy Confident on
Guantánamo Closure, BBC News, Sept. 16, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/8260081.stm (reporting on Special Envoy Daniel Fried’s efforts to resettle
detainees). Even under Obama, the process is still highly secretive. See E.U.
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the resulting process of political maneuvering, the United States
tries to find resettlement countries that will accept the detainees, but
could resort to sending detainees back to their countries of origin if a
resettlement country is not found.72 Return to a detainee’s country of
origin is especially likely for those detainees who fear persecution
that does not rise to the level of torture, as the United States has not
publicly committed itself to any policy against returning detainees to
mistreatment that falls short of torture.73 This process of peddling
detainees around the world has been long, difficult, and fraught with
uncertainty for the detainees, the courts, and the executive branch
itself. While it goes on, the refugee detainees live in fear of
repatriation and the United States is prevented from closing
Guantánamo.74
The executive branch has been attempting to resettle some
detainees for nearly the entire time the detention center in
Guantánamo has existed. Classified declarations submitted by
attorneys for the Uighurs reveal that the United States began
searching for a country that would offer the Uighurs asylum as early
as 2002.75 Now, the process is less covert. Daniel Fried, appointed by
President Obama to be the special envoy on Guantánamo, is
entrusted with the task of negotiating repatriation or resettlement
for detainees who have been cleared for release.76 Fried, accompanied
by a staff of three, spends his time globetrotting and meeting with

Wants Answers Before It Accepts Guantánamo Detainees, Int’l Herald Tribune,
Mar. 17, 2009 (stating that the Obama administration has “continued to keep a
tight reign” on information about the detainees); Low-Level Fighters, supra note
12 (quoting a letter from seven Republicans on the House Appropriations
Committee complaining to Obama’s national security advisor that the detainee
“transfers have been done under a cloak of secrecy . . . which ensures that most
Members [of Congress] and the general public will remain unaware of the actions
taken”); see also Belbacha Motion, supra note 16 (complaining that “only the
government knows” whether detainee petitioner will be transferred to Algeria).
72. See Michelle Shephard, How To Empty Guantánamo, Toronto Star, Dec.
6, 2009, at IN1 (describing the resettlement process under “Guantánamo czar”
Special Envoy Fried). Because the United States will not disclose whether it
considers detainees to be refugees or certain transfers to be risky, it maintains
freedom to transfer at will without openly violating its own policy.
73. See supra Part II.B.2.
74. See Belbacha Motion, supra note 16 (expressing detainee’s fear of
sudden return without notice); Shephard, supra note 72, at IN1 (reporting that
detainee resettlement issues could derail closing Guantánamo).
75. Brief of Petitioners, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (No. 081234).
76. Shephard, supra note 72, at IN1; Manel, supra note 71.
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ambassadors, prime ministers, and other state officials, in an effort
to broker agreements with foreign states to accept the Guantánamo
detainees. Fried travels with portfolios of the detainees, so that he
can put a name, face, and story to each detainee he attempts
to “sell.” 77 The negotiations have included discussions about what
support the United States will provide to assist the foreign state
with resettling the detainee. 78 In addition, the United States has
attempted to secure assurances from the potential resettlement state
that the state will monitor the detainees upon their return. 79 By
Fried’s own admission, determining how and where to resettle the
remaining refugee detainees is “a huge problem and a complicated
one.”80 The project faces an array of challenges:
First, countries are reluctant to accept detainees in light of
the United States’ own refusal to accept any detainees for
resettlement. Special Envoy Fried says, “[i]t is fair to say, as just an
objective statement, that the U.S. could resettle more detainees, had
we been willing to take in some.” 81 In fact, to secure Germany’s
agreement to accept detainees, the United States reportedly had to
agree to promise to “consider” taking some.82
Second, many countries resist accepting detainees because of
the fear that they are potentially dangerous.83 Even while the United
States compiles profiles on the detainees in an effort to persuade
foreign states that the detainees will not pose a security risk when
they are resettled, the United States deliberately maintains the
77. See generally id.; Shephard, supra note 72, at IN1; William Glaberson &
Mark Landler, Top Diplomat to Be Named Special Envoy on Guantánamo, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 11, 2009, at A18.
78. See Shephard, supra note 72, at IN1.
79. See id.
80. Manel, supra note 71.
81. Id.; Germany’s Guests from Guantánamo—Are the Former Prisoners
a Security Threat?, Spiegel Online (Jul. 12, 2010), http://www.spiegel.de/
international/germany/0,1518,705955,00.html [hereinafter Germany’s Guests].
82. See id. (reporting that the U.S. government “expressly promised” to
“work on ways to find humanitarian solutions for all detainees approved for
release” and clarifying that “[t]he phrase ‘humanitarian solutions’ refers to
inmates being accepted in the United States”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
83. See E.U. “Fact-Finding” Mission on Guantánamo Inmates, Agence
France Presse (English Wire), Mar. 17, 2009, 3/17/09 AFRP 01:37:00 (quoting
E.U. Justice Commissioner Jacques Barrot as stating, “[t]here is a very deep
wariness on the part of EU interior ministers, who are concerned about the
difficulties of hosting one or another inmate. To do that, we need to know a lot
about the candidates.”).

2011]

BEYOND THE GUANTANAMO BIND

715

“enemy combatant” designation and issues alarming statements
about the threat of releasing detainees from Guantánamo. 84 This
double-speak arises from dueling motivations in the executive
branch. While the State Department paints the detainees in a
sympathetic light to persuade states to accept them for resettlement,
the Defense Department defends its arrest and continued detention
of the detainees by claiming that they are dangerous combatants.85
These contradictory positions lead the Government to engage in
strange, self-defeating moves, such as sharing uncorroborated and
inflammatory information from the refugee detainees’ files
with potential resettlement countries.86 In effect, the Government is
expressly sending mixed messages to foreign counterparts: at once
attempting to sell the detainees as safe for resettlement while
simultaneously maintaining that they are properly detained as
enemy combatants.
Third, the United States must negotiate extensive
agreements with potential resettlement countries before detainees
can be resettled. These agreements cover issues such as the
immigration status the detainees will be afforded, repatriation costs

84. See, e.g., Vice President Dick Cheney, Address at the American
Enterprise Institute (May 21, 2009), http://www.aei.org/speech/100050 (“1 in 7
[detainees] cut a straight path back to their prior line of work and have conducted
murderous attacks in the Middle East.”); Elisabeth Bumiller, Later Terror Link
Cited for 1 in 7 Freed Detainees, N.Y. Times, May 20, 2009, at A1 (reporting that
“an unreleased Pentagon report concludes that one in seven” of the Guantánamo
detainees already transferred abroad from Guantánamo “are engaged in
terrorism or militant activity”). For a discussion of the substantial press coverage
given to the recidivism figures based on the New York Times article, see Dan
Kennedy,
The Myth of Guantánamo
Recidivism,
The
Guardian,
June 9, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/jun/09/g
uantanamo-new-york-times (reporting on the political storm and the conclusion
in the press that the supposed recidivism numbers were uncorroborated and
ultimately discredited).
85. See infra note 209 and accompanying text.
86. See Andy Worthington, Finding New Homes For 44 Cleared
The
Public
Record
(Oct.
13,
2009),
Guantánamo
Prisoners,
http://pubrecord.org/world/5751/finding-homes-cleared-Guantánamo
(reporting
that during a visit to Guantánamo by Swiss officials, U.S. officials “opened up
their files,” showing the Swiss evidence in detainees’ files including discredited
statements made by other detainees under duress, “multiple levels of
unacceptable hearsay, and ‘mosaics’ of intelligence that do not stand up to
independent scrutiny”). After the visit, Swiss media reported that the officials
had determined that some detainees were “medium” or “high” risk, despite the
fact that those detainees had been cleared for release by both the Bush and
Obama administrations. Id.
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covered by the United States, services the host country will provide
to facilitate the detainees’ integration, and whether the host country
will monitor the detainees once they are transferred.87 The potential
arrangements can and reportedly do break down if agreement is not
reached on any of these thorny issues.88
Fourth, the resettlement process faces complex global
political problems. For example, the Chinese government actively
sought repatriation of the Uighurs to China, where it is widely
believed the Uighers would be tortured or executed for their avowed
separatism from the Chinese government. Classified documents
submitted into the record before the D.C. Circuit in Kiyemba contain
evidence of “extensive diplomatic resistance from China to
resettlement of the Uighurs abroad and failed efforts over six years
to obtain asylum from more than 100 countries.”89 Although Albania
accepted six Uighur detainees who had never been designated enemy
combatants very early in the resettlement process, neither the Bush
nor the Obama administration was able to find countries willing to
accept the remaining detainees until 2009 and 2010, despite
the extensive effort the administrations had invested in the task.90
Finally, in 2009 and 2010, the Obama administration convinced two
geopolitically weak allies, Palau and Bermuda, to accept all but five
of the remaining Uighurs. 91 This arrangement came at a cost.
Officials negotiated the agreement with Bermuda in secret behind
closed doors and only publicly announced the final details after the
detainees arrived in Bermuda via a clandestine, midnight flight.92 As
soon as the news broke, Great Britain, of which Bermuda is a
protectorate, expressed its disapproval. Fried, the U.S. envoy,
claimed that he was “admonished by the British government in very
clear terms” after concluding arrangements to transfer the Uighurs

87. See Manel, supra note 71; Shephard, supra note 72.
88. See Manel, supra note 71 (quoting Fried as stating that “[t]he British
government, it is fair to say, cannot be considered part of the deal” and that,
furthermore, he had been “admonished by the British Government in very clear
terms”).
89. Brief of Petitioners at 4, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010)
(No. 08-1234).
90. See id. at 9.
91. Id. at 14, 15.
92. Erik Eckholm, Out of Guantánamo, Uighurs Bask in Bermuda, N.Y.
Times, June 15, 2009, at A4; see also Manel, supra note 71.
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to Bermuda without consulting the British Government.93 As of early
2011, several Uighurs still remain in Guantánamo.94
Fifth, the extreme secrecy of the resettlement process has
triggered exasperation in Congress. As seven Republicans on the
House Appropriations Committee complained in a letter to President
Obama’s national security advisor, “[t]hese transfers have been done
under a cloak of secrecy with notifications sent to Congress in
classified form—which ensure that most Members and the general
public will remain unaware of the actions taken.”95 In response to the
perceived secrecy and unilateral nature of the transfers, Congress
demanded that the executive branch provide Congress with 15 days’
advance notice before transferring detainees, subjecting the process
to yet more potential delays and preventing the swift execution of a
deal with a foreign state.96
Finally, because accepting detainees can be as politically
unpopular abroad as it is in the United States, some countries will
postpone an agreement until after elections or until a sister state
agrees to accept detainees.97 Even where agreements between states
have been made, such as the agreement among European Union
member states concluded in June 2009,98 these agreements have had
93. Eckholm, supra note 92. Presumably, it was important to Britain to
send a message to China that it had nothing to do with the resettlement deal.
94. Kiyemba v. Obama, 563 U.S. ___ (2011) (No. 10-775) (stating that the
United States continues to imprison five Uighers).
95. Peter Finn, Guantanamo Detainee Review Complicated, but Political
Implications Remain, Wash. Post, May 28, 2010, WP-BUS (no page).
96. See Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-83, § 552(e), 123 Stat. 2177, 2178–79 (2009) (prohibiting transfer of any
detainees away from Guantánamo until 15 days after Congress is notified); see
also Low-Level Fighters, supra note 12 (reporting that prior to the enactment of
the law requiring 15-days’ notice prior to transfer, members of Congress
complained to the Obama Administration that the detainee transfer process was
too secretive).
97.
See, e.g., Guantánamo Detainees—German Government Plays for Time,
(Apr.
26,
2010),
http://www.spiegel.de/international/
Spiegel
Online
germany/0,1518,691216,00.html (stating that Germany’s federal government is
“unlikely to make a decision on whether to accept three inmates” from
Guantánamo until after state elections because “[r]esistance to taking in
prisoners is still strong in states led by the conservatives”).
98.
See Joint Statement of the E.U. and its Member States and the United
States of America on the Closure of the Guantánamo Bay Detention Facility and
Future Counterterrorism Cooperation, Based on Shared Values, International
Law, and Respect for the Rule of Law and Human Rights, Brussels Council of the
European Union (June 16, 2009), http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_
8794_en.htm [hereinafter Joint Statement] (expressing the “readiness” of certain

718

COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[42:697

limited value in furthering resettlement agreements. For many
European Union member states, the Joint Statement has served as
little more than a statement of intent. After signing the agreement,
some countries came forward to assist, but seven months later only
seven former detainees had been accepted into European countries.99

III. CRITIQUE OF THE U.S. APPROACH
The method by which the United States manages
resettlement of refugee detainees in Guantánamo inhabits grey areas
of domestic and international law, arguably satisfying those laws in
letter, but violating them in spirit and sacrificing moral goods in the
process. The questionable legality and morality of this process
requires the United States to sacrifice needless political capital on
the international stage.

A. Exploiting Legal Shadows
In the separate context of forcible interstate transfer of
suspected terrorists, Joan Fitzpatrick argues that the Bush
Administration adopted the legal term “rendition” to “clothe [the
Administration’s] enforcement techniques with a veneer of quasilegal respectability, while acknowledging no binding limits
on ‘operational flexibility.’”100 Fitzpatrick notes that states have
increasingly turned to “quasi-formal” methods of rendition—a
concept that has no fixed meaning in international law—to escape
the “formalities of the extradition process.”101
Fitzpatrick’s observations extend to the refugee-detainee
context as well. The United States evades formal limitations on its
capacity to transfer refugee detainees by claiming exemption from
the domestic and international laws that govern treatment of
E.U. Member States to assist with the reception of former detainees on a case-bycase basis).
99.
See Press Release, Amnesty Int’l, European States Must Take Concrete
Steps to Help Close Guantánamo (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.amnestyusa.org/
document.php?id=ENGNAU2010011114899&lang=e (stating that “only a few
European governments have stepped forward to help those in need of protection”
and that human rights organizations have “expressed disappointment” that many
EU member states “had not taken concrete steps in line with the [Joint
Statement]”).
100. Joan Fitzpatrick, Rendition and Transfer in the War Against Terrorism:
Guantánamo and Beyond, 25 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 457, 457 (2003)
[herinafter Rendition].
101. Id.
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refugees.102 At the same time, the United States invokes Fitzpatrick’s
“quasi-legal veneer of respectability” by announcing an unenforceable
“policy” against transfer to torture, which may or may not purport to
protect against transfers that would violate the non-refoulement
principle of the Refugee Convention, as outlined below. This strategy,
although only questionably legal, is as of yet undisturbed by U.S. and
international courts.

1. Avoiding Safeguards Against Release to Persecution or
Torture
As a party to the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees (“Refugee Convention”),103 the United States
has obligations under international law to (a) refrain from returning
non-excludable refugees to a state where they will be persecuted or
tortured and to (b) provide potential refugees with a status
determination prior to issuing a final order of removal.104 Whether
the United States is bound by these obligations to detainees in
Guantánamo falls into a legal grey area.

a. Scope of Protection
For every person who has been forced to flee his or her home
country out of fear of persecution, international law guarantees
protections against being returned to that country. The Refugee
Convention provides for the right of non-refoulement, or nonreturn. 105 Article 33 of the Refugee Convention defines the nonrefoulement obligation: State parties may not “expel or return
102. Similarly, Margaret Satterthwaite notes in the rendition context that
U.S. government officials do not “explicitly support” the practice of “informal
transfer to a risk of torture,” but nevertheless defend their right to engage in it by
“pointing to . . . lacunae in the relevant legal frameworks.” Satterthwaite, supra
note 57, at 1333 (“The administration suggests that where lacunae are found
prohibitions give way to permission; territories outside the United States are
conceptualized as locations where the United States may act as it pleases.”).
103. The United States is a party to the Refugee Convention by virtue of its
accession to the Protocol. See supra note 3.
104. See supra Part III.A.1.
105. Refugee Convention, supra note 3, art. 33. The term “refoulement” is
derived from the French term “refouler” which stands for the act of returning or
sending back. See Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law 117
(Clarendon Press, 2d ed. 1996) (stating that non-refoulement is a fundamental
principle of international law establishing that “no refugee should be returned to
any country where he or she is likely to face persecution or torture”); see also
Helton, supra note 3.
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(‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account
of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion.”106 A parallel provision in the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment (“Torture Convention”) prohibits refoulement to a
location where the person will be subject to torture.107 The United
States is bound by the Refugee Convention’s non-refoulement
requirement because it is a party to the Convention through its
accession to the 1967 Protocol.108

106. Refugee Convention, supra note 3, art. 33. Article 32 sets constraints on
the ability of state parties to expel a refugee in their territory lawfully:
(1) The Contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully in
their territory save on grounds of national security or public
order.
(2) The expulsion of such a refugee shall be only in pursuance
of a decision reached in accordance with due process of law.
Except where compelling reasons of national security
otherwise require, the refugee shall be allowed to submit
evidence to clear himself, and to appeal to and be
represented for the purpose before competent authority or a
person or persons specially designated by the competent
authority.
Id. art. 32.
107. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment. G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51,
U.N. Doc. A/39/51 at 197 (Dec. 10, 1984) (entered into force June 26, 1987)
[hereinafter Torture Convention] (“No State Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’)
or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”). The Refugee
and Torture Conventions offer distinct but overlapping spheres of protection; a
petitioner may be entitled to relief under one or both. This Article focuses on the
Refugee Convention throughout, but with the understanding that refugees under
the Refugee Convention will often also fall under the Torture Convention, and the
same resettlement strategies are applicable to both. For further analysis of
Torture Convention relief in the Guantánamo detainee context, see
Satterthwaite, supra note 57, at 1367, and Robert Chesney, Leaving
Guantánamo: The Law of International Detainee Transfers, 40 U. Rich. L. Rev.
657, 673 (2006).
108. Protocol, supra note 3. Moreover, Professor Goodwin-Gill and others
suggest that the non-refoulement principle has also become part of jus cogens
international law, and so binds even states that are not parties to the Refugee
Convention. See Goodwin-Gill, supra note 105, at 167 (“There is substantial, if
not conclusive, authority that the principle is binding on all States, independently
of specific assent.”); Jean Allain, The Jus Cogens Nature of Non-Refoulement,
13 Int'l J. Refugee L. 533, 538–41 (2001) (stating that non-refoulement has
not only become a norm of international law, but has reached the status of
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According to Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention,
“refugee” means any person who:
[O]wing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion, is outside
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing
to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country; or who, not having a
nationality and being outside the country of his
former habitual residence as a result of such events,
is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return
to it.109
Thus, to qualify for refugee status such that the nonrefoulement principle is triggered, the Refugee Convention requires
an applicant to prove that he or she fears persecution in his or her
home state due to his or her race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular social group, or political opinion.110
The prohibition of refoulement presupposes that there will be
an effective way of determining who is and who is not a “refugee.”111
jus cogens); Elihu Lauterpacht & Daniel Bethlehem, Opinion: The Scope and
Content of the Principle of Non-Refoulement, 61–62, 64–65 (June 20, 2001),
available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendocPDFViewer.html
?docid=3b33574d1&query=Elihu%20Lauterpacht%20&%20Daniel%20Bethlehem
(citing UNHCR, Executive Committee, Conclusions Adopted by the Executive
Committee on the International Protection of Refugees, No. 6 (XXVII) and No. 25
(XXXIII)).
109. Refugee Convention, supra note 3.
110. Id.
111. See Mark Pallis, The Operation of UNHCR’s Accountability Mechanisms,
37 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 869, 880 (2005). Pallis argues that for the nonrefoulement principle to be meaningful or effective, it must include a refugee
status determination:
When the rule of non-refoulement is combined with the
“guarantee of effective legal protection”—a general principle of
law—the [Refugee Status Determination] obligation is created:
an obligation to conduct refugee status determination in a
manner which provides effective legal protection against the
possibility of refoulement or denial of rights due under the
Refugee Convention.
Id.; see also Reinhard Marx, Non-Refoulement, Access to Procedures, and
Responsibility for Determining Refugee Claims, 7 Int’l J. Refugee L. 383, 405
(1995) (arguing that the non-refoulement obligation encompasses an obligation to
determine whether potential claimants are refugees); UNHCR, Advisory Opinion
Regarding Minimum Standards for Refugee Status Determination Procedures 2
(Oct. 16, 2006), available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/protect/opendoc
.pdf?tbl=PROTECTION&id=3b389254a [hereinafter Advisory Opinion]. The
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The Refugee Convention does not set out guidelines as to what
should constitute refugee status determination procedures, leaving
implementation of such procedures to the discretion of state parties
to the Convention.112 The consensus of these state parties, expressed
through the Executive Committee to the UNHCR, is that the
Convention requires states to provide access to such procedures to
everyone who seeks the protections of refugee status.113 States must
institute a process for identification of refugees in order to give effect
to their obligations under the Convention and ensure compliance
with the principle of non-refoulement.114
If a person meets the definition of a refugee, a state may then
evaluate whether the refugee is “excludable” based on criminal
history, or “expellable” because they pose a national security risk.115
refugee status obligation is an asylum seeker’s “right . . . to a hearing in order to
determine whether that person meets the criteria of the Convention.” Pallis,
supra, at 879–80 & n.33 (citing The Haitian Centre for Human Rights et al. v.
United States, Case 10.675, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 51/96,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. P 155 (1997)).
112. See Advisory Opinion, supra note 111, at 2.
113. See Pallis, supra note 111, at 885 (citing UNHCR Executive Committee
Conclusion No. 81 (XLVIII) (1997), para. (h); UNHCR Executive Committee
Conclusion No. 82 (XLVIII), “Safeguarding Asylum,” para. (d)(iii) (1997); UNHCR
Executive Committee Conclusion No. 85 (XLIX), “International Protection,” para.
(q) (1998)). The UNHCR Executive Committee is a group of United Nations
member states that advises the UNHCR in the exercise of its mandate. See id.
(describing the significance of Executive Committee conclusions, which “are not
formally binding” but “relevant to the interpretation and application of the
international refugee protection regime”; the conclusions “constitute expressions
of opinion, which are broadly representative of the views of the international
community. . . . [t]he specialized knowledge of the Committee and the fact that its
conclusions are reached by consensus adds further weight”); see also GoodwinGill, supra note 105, at 7–18.
114. Advisory Opinion, supra note 111, at 2.
115. International refugee law excludes specific categories of persons
regardless of whether they meet the criteria of refugee set forth in Article 1 (A) of
the Refugee Convention, so long as there are “serious reasons” for considering
that they have engaged in criminal acts, in their State of origin or elsewhere,
before entering a host State. Refugee Convention, supra note 3, art. 1F. Persons
may be excluded from refugee protections when there is sufficient evidence to
show that the person has committed any of the following:
The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person
with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering
that: (a) He has committed a crime against peace, a war crime,
or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international
instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such
crimes; (b) He has committed a serious non-political crime
outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that
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If the refugee is not excludable or expellable, a state signatory to the
Refugee Convention must not remove the refugee from its territory,
although the state party may exercise its discretion as to whether it
will grant asylum. 116 While no international law or norm restricts
a state’s right to deny entry,117 binding treaties—including the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 118 and the
Geneva Conventions 119 —prohibit states from holding a refugee in
detention for an excessive period of time.120 Read together, the
prohibitions on refoulement and indefinite detention require that a
state choosing not to offer asylum to a refugee must find some other

country as a refugee; (c) He has been guilty of acts contrary to
the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
Id.; see also UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: Application of the
Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, HCR/GIP/03/05 (September 4, 2003) (providing guidance on
interpretation and application of Refugee Convention Article 1F); Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 14(2), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR] (stating that the right to
asylum “may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from
non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the
United Nations”).
116. See Joan Fitzpatrick, Revitalizing the 1951 Refugee Convention, 9 Harv.
Hum. Rts. J. 229, 245 n.71 (1996) [hereinafter Fitzpatrick, Revitalizing] (citing
Article 14 of the UDHR, which provides that “[e]veryone has the right to seek and
to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution”). There is no corresponding
duty on states to admit asylum seekers. Id.
117. See Fitzpatrick, Temporary Protection, supra note 4, at 281 n.14 (citing
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 706–12 (1893) for a discussion of
the absolute sovereign power to control the presence of foreigners and its roots in
pre-twentieth-century public international law).
118. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 19, 1966, art. 9(4), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 176 (entered into force Mar.
23, 1976 and ratified by the United States in 1992) [hereinafter ICCPR] (stating
that every detainee has a right to judicial review of his detention by a competent
court that may “order his release if the detention is not lawful”); see also Brief of
International Law Experts as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, at 21–28,
Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (No. 08-1234) [hereinafter Int’l Law
Amici] (examining ICCPR requirements). Moreover, all of the major human
rights instruments recognize a right not to be arbitrarily detained by the state.
See id.
119. See infra Part III.A.2 (outlining Geneva Convention requirements
against prolonged arbitrary detention).
120. See Donkoh, supra note 5 (noting the illegality of prolonged arbitrary
detention in lieu of asylum).
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solution to the refugee’s plight. In many cases, the refugee goes on to
enjoy asylum in the country of refuge.121

b. Refugee Protection at Guantánamo?
The United States has rejected asylum petitions by detainees
in Guantánamo on the grounds of extraterritoriality.122 This means
that the United States has concluded that the refugee detainees in
Guantánamo are not eligible for Refugee Convention protections
because they are not within U.S. territory. This conclusion follows
the landmark case of Sale v. Haitian Centers Counsel, in which the
Supreme Court held that domestic law implementing the Refugee
Convention does not restrain the executive’s discretion to return
refugees interdicted outside U.S. territory.123 The Supreme Court also
121. See UNHCR, History of UNHCR: A Global Humanitarian Organization
of Humble Origins, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646cbc.html (last visited
Feb. 5, 2011) [hereinafter History of UNHCR]. But see infra note 237 (discussing
practices by countries wishing to avoid granting asylum to all claimants, which
violate or circumvent international law).
122. Habeas Attorney Interview, supra note 61.
123. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 170–77 (1993)
(finding that section 243(h)(1) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act applies
only in the context of domestic procedures by which the Attorney General
determines whether deportable and excludable aliens may remain in the United
States, particularly in the context of deportation and exclusion hearings, which
do not take place outside the United States); see also Keith Highet, George
Kahale III & Thomas David Jones, International Decisions: Sale v. Haitian
Centers Council, Inc., 88 Am. J. Int’l L. 105, 114–121 (1994) (summarizing Sale:
the domestic law prohibition against refoulement applies only for those who are at
the border or who have been temporarily paroled into the country, and so Haitian
refugees interdicted on high seas had no legally cognizable rights under domestic
law). The Refugee Convention leaves implementation to domestic law. See
Fitzpatrick, Temporary Protection, supra note 4, at 281 n.13 (noting that
implementation of the Refugee Convention occurs within domestic legal systems
and is not supervised by a treaty body or international court). Fitzpatrick notes
that refugee treaties are incorporated in domestic law to an unusual degree and
the Refugee Convention is the subject of frequent interpretation and application
by national courts and administrative agencies charged with refugee status
determination. Id. The United States implemented the Convention by enacting
the Refugee Act of 1980. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1982); see also Daniel J. Smith,
Political Asylum—Well-Founded Fear of Persecution, 13 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of
Facts § 2 (2005) (outlining the statutory basis for asylum in the United States).
The Refugee Act amended the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) to
establish a statutory basis for granting asylum in the United States consistent
with the 1967 Protocol and provided the Attorney General with the power to
establish an administrative system for processing asylum-seekers and discretion
to grant asylum if an alien meets the definition of a refugee. Id.
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held that the United States has no responsibility under international
law to apply Refugee Convention protections extraterritorially. 124
Indeed, the United States takes the position that none of its
international
human
rights
treaty
obligations
apply
extraterritorially.125
The U.S. invocation of an extraterritoriality exception to the
Refugee Convention has dubious validity under international law.126
In addition, commentators suggest that the jus cogens customary
international norm against refoulement applies beyond state borders
and should inform the interpretation of Refugee Convention norms.127
124. See Sale, 509 U.S. at 155 (holding that Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee
Convention and the 1967 Protocol do not apply extraterritorially, and holding
that signatory states are obligated only with respect to aliens within a state’s
territory); see also Highet, et al., supra note 123, at 121 (reviewing the decision).
For critiques of this conclusion, see Koh, supra note 6, at 2391 and Harry A.
Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 Yale L.J. 39, 43
(1994) (stating that the court majority did not “acknowledg[e] the primacy of the
principle of nonrefoulement in customary international law” notwithstanding the
fact that the statute at issue was enacted pursuant to a multilateral treaty,
making customary international law particularly relevant).
125. See Chesney, supra note 107, at 673.
126. See Lori A. Nessel, Externalized Borders and the Invisible Refugee, 40
Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 625, 627 (2009) (reviewing inconsistent rulings by a
number of international human rights bodies, including the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, regarding the legality of U.S. policy of
interception and forced return of refugees).
127. See Goodwin-Gill, supra note 105, at 123–24 (suggesting that the
customary international law principle of non-refoulement has come to encompass
non-rejection at the frontier); Blackmun, supra note 124, at 43 (critiquing U.S.
policy based on the extraterritorial nature of non-refoulement); UNHCR,
Executive Committee Report: Determination of Refugee Status, No. 8 (XXVIII)
(Oct. 12, 1977), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae68c6e4.html
(concluding that the principle of non-refoulement of asylum-seekers applies both
at the borders and within the territory of states); Savitri Taylor, Australia’s
Implementation of its Non-Refoulement Obligations Under The Convention
Against Torture and other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
17 U.N.S.W. L. J. 432, 435 (1994) (stating that “[t]he danger against which article
33(1) of the Refugee Convention provides protection is the return (refoulement)
by a state party of any ‘refugee’ to a country where his or her ‘life or freedom
would be threatened’” and that “state practice appears to establish that the
prohibition against refoulement extends to preventing state parties rejecting
asylum seekers at their borders”). But see Robert L. Newmark, Non-Refoulement
Run Afoul: The Questionable Legality of Extraterritorial Repatriation Programs,
71 Wash. U. L. Q. 833, 858 (1993) (concluding that given substantial uncertainty
about whether the non-refoulement principle applies beyond state borders, the
principle must be clarified).
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Moreover, as some commentators have suggested, the
extraterritoriality exception may not be appropriate under U.S.
domestic law. The executive’s legal argument that Sale applies to
detainees in Guantánamo ignores the ways in which Guantánamo
petitioners are within the jurisdiction and control of the United
States, and may conflict with the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Rasul.128 In Sale, the Supreme Court found that the United States
was not violating the Refugee Convention in failing to provide
refugee status determinations for Haitians interdicted on the high
seas.129 In Rasul, however, the Supreme Court held that Guantánamo
detainees are within U.S. jurisdiction for the purposes of habeas
corpus on the ground that habeas jurisdiction extends to places
where the U.S. exercises plenary and exclusive jurisdiction even
without “ultimate sovereignty.” 130 No court has yet determined
whether Rasul must change U.S. asylum policy with respect to the
Guantánamo petitioners.131 However, in Rasul, the Supreme Court
found that the U.S. facility at Guantánamo is completely under the
U.S. military’s custody and control.132 Unlike the Haitian refugees in
Sale who were interdicted at sea, the detainees in Guantánamo have
no opportunity to apply for refugee determinations in other countries.

128. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 466–67 (2004); see, e.g., Satterthwaite,
supra note 57, at 1375 (arguing that the United States is pointing to the wrong
rule of international human rights law when it argues that the non-refoulement
norms do not apply in the context of extraordinary rendition and concluding that
instead of using a “territorial rule of jurisdiction,” it should be applying the
“personal control doctrine”); Chesney, supra note 107, at 674–75 (concluding that
if Guantánamo is “within ‘the territorial jurisdiction’ of the United States” for the
purposes of the habeas statute, as Rasul held, there is no ground for concluding
that it is not also U.S. territory for purposes of U.S. treaty obligations). Chesney
concludes that Rasul is not in tension with Sale because the latter “merely
addressed the Refugee Convention’s non-refoulement language in connection with
U.S. actions that take place on the high seas.” Id.; see also Helton, supra note 3,
at 2342 (arguing that the principle of non-refoulement has an extraterritorial
aspect and that prospective asylum seekers are entitled to protection and
“procedures sufficient to assess entitlement to refugee protection”).
129. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 155 (1993).
130. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475.
131. In Kiyemba, the D.C. Circuit considered the question whether the U.S.
must extend Refugee Convention rights to detainees through immigration law,
but declined to answer. Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1029–31 (D.C. Cir.
2009). The D.C. Circuit did not consider Rasul. Id. The Kiyemba decision was
vacated, remanded, and reinstated without the Supreme Court weighing in on
this question. See Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010); 559 U.S. ___ (2010)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 563 U.S. ___ (2011).
132. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 466.
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The language of Rasul thus strongly implies that Guantánamo is
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States for the
purposes of the Refugee Convention as incorporated in U.S. law.133
Exploiting the legal uncertainty regarding whether Refugee
Convention rights attach via international or domestic law, the
United States has declined to offer detainees at Guantánamo the
opportunity to demonstrate their status as refugees.134 There is no
official mechanism in place to determine which detainees fear torture
or persecution upon return. Some would likely meet the refugee
definition under the Convention if status determinations were to be
conducted,135 but in the absence of such a determination it is difficult
to tell whether the refugee detainees face a risk of persecution on a
protected ground if returned to their countries of nationality. 136 A
policy against returning detainees to torture or persecution is
ineffective when the United States does not determine whether a
detainee is a refugee and a transfer would constitute a refoulement.137
133. See Chesney, supra note 107, at 675.
134. See Kiyemba, 555 F.3d at 1030–31 (stating that the executive did not
consider whether the petitioners were eligible for asylum or refugee status
because they did not apply for this relief in the United States).
135. For example, there is universal agreement that the Uighurs would face
torture or worse on account of their ethnic group or political opinion. See supra
Part II.A.
136. Without some sort of refugee status determination, the United States
may not even know whether the detainees it is returning are potentially refugees.
Only a small number of detainees have petitioned for asylum in the United
States, and those petitions have been summarily denied on the ground of
extraterritoriality without a refugee status determination being made. See, e.g.,
Habeas Attorney Interview, supra note 61. Since the asylum route in the United
States is generally perceived among detainees and counsel to be a dead end,
many detainees have not petitioned for asylum even if they do fear persecution.
See Kiyemba, 555 F.3d at 1031 (stating that the Uighurs had not petitioned for
asylum). Aside from declining to petition because the exercise is futile, some
detainees hesitate to do so because they fear publicly criticizing home states
when there is a real possibility that they will be repatriated to those states. See
Habeas Attorney Interview, supra note 61 (indicating that her client was
reluctant to file an asylum petition because he feared repercussions from his
home country, but eventually did so); Reprieve, supra note 38 (stating that
immediately after Ahmed Belbacha publicly announced his fear of persecution in
Algeria he was tried in absentia and sentenced to 20 years in prison there on
dubious charges).
137. Administration officials reportedly evaluate transfers based on the
safety of the receiving country. See Six Detainees, supra note 34 (quoting
administration officials as stating, “We take some care in evaluating countries for
repatriation. In the case of Algeria, there is an established track record and we
have given that a lot of weight . . . The Algerians have handled this pretty well:
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2. Redefining “Release”
In addition to exploiting the legal uncertainty regarding the
status of the detainees under domestic and international refugee law,
the United States also exploits legal ambiguity regarding (1) where
detainees must be released, (2) what constitutes “release,” and
(3) when release must take place.

a. Release Where?
Detainees who have been cleared by habeas courts are
entitled to release—on this point there is no serious debate.138 The
question now on the table is whether this is a right without a
remedy. In holding that U.S. courts do not have the power to force
the executive’s hand and order release into the United States, the
D.C. Circuit in Kiyemba did not quarrel with the proposition that the
detainees must be released.139 However, it held that petitioners had
invoked no law entitling them to release in the United States. 140
Because the Supreme Court vacated the D.C. Circuit’s ruling without
addressing this point, and denied certiorari when the D.C. Circuit
reinstated that ruling, the question remains open: What power do the
district courts have to demand release in the United States?141

You don’t have recidivism and you don’t have torture.”). The executive’s
determination that some countries are safe for resettlement does little to protect
detainees against refoulement. A country may be safe for some and not for others.
138. See Brief for the Respondents at 1, 25, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct.
1235 (2010) (No. 08-1234) (conceding that petitioners—who had obtained habeas
review and prevailed—were entitled to release). The government conceded that in
the usual case, a petitioner who brings a successful habeas petition is entitled to
“release . . . to his home country.” Id. at 18–19 (citation omitted).
139. Kiyemba, 555 F.3d at 1028 (characterizing petitioner’s request as “an
extraordinary remedy” above and beyond “simple release”).
140. Id. at 1028 n.13 (“[P]etitioners have cited no case in which a federal
court ordered the Executive to bring an alien into the United States and to
release him here, when the alien was held outside our sovereign territory.”).
Finding that “[t]he government has represented that it is continuing diplomatic
attempts to find an appropriate country willing to admit petitioners,” the Court
concluded that it had no “power to require anything more.” Id. at 1029.
141. The Kiyemba rule is that the courts cannot order release into the United
States while the government represents that it is continuing diplomatic efforts to
resettle habeas-cleared detainees. Kiyema v. Obama, 563 U.S. ___ (2011) (No. 10775). Though under-theorized and ripe for further analysis, the question is
beyond the scope of this Article.
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b. What Is “Release”?
To avoid a court determination that the detainees must be
released in the United States, and after conceding that detainees are
entitled to release when a habeas court orders it, the executive
chiseled down the meaning of that entitlement. 142 To avoid the
conclusion that U.S. courts are empowered to enforce the release
orders, the executive draws a dubious distinction between “military
detention at Guantánamo . . . in an enemy status” and “custody at
Guantánamo . . . in a non-enemy status.” 143 The government relied
upon this supposed distinction to argue that transferring a detainee
to the “non-enemy” status has not been considered “a constitutionally
inadequate response to a habeas court’s order of release.”144 In doing
so, the government explained that detainees of that status have
“significantly more living privileges” than those held by detainees “in
military detention,” implying that these privileges amount to some
sort of quasi-release.145
The government’s inventory of liberties that add up to
“significantly more living privileges” demonstrates the poverty of this
form of “release.” Habeas-cleared detainees have an air-conditioned
living space, and they have access to a variety of entertainment and
recreational equipment, special food items, and library materials.146
They can also make telephone calls to family members—a privilege
denied to the general population at Guantánamo—and send and
receive mail, which the military screens for “operational purposes.”147
Finally, cleared detainees are afforded the privilege of
communicating with counsel outside, albeit through a chain-link
fence.148

142. See Brief for the Respondents at 18, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235
(2010) (No. 08-1234).
143. Id. at 1.
144. Id. at 21. The government also argued that “[a] habeas court acts
appropriately in granting the writ and ordering that the government cease
detaining the individuals in an enemy status, while allowing the government to
pursue opportunities for resettlement in other countries, as well as to hold the
individuals in suitable conditions of custody.” Id. at 25.
145. Id. at 21 (citation omitted).
146. Id.
147. Id. at n.25 (noting the exception of “legal mail,” which is not screened).
148. Id. (noting that in the future if detainees wish to meet with counsel
indoors they will be permitted to do so without being chained to the floor, as was
the previous practice).

730

COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[42:697

c. Release When?
After the Supreme Court rejected the executive’s initial
attempt to carve out an exception for terrorist combatants from
international law, 149 the executive switched tactics, applying the
window-dressing of universal “enemy combatant” designations to
justify continued detention.150 The designations present another legal
challenge, this time to the contours of international law: When the
United States refuses to lift the “enemy combatant” designation, even
while “clearing” detainees for release, at what point does continued
detention become “prolonged” and “arbitrary,” in violation of the
Geneva Convention and other international law obligations?151
Some commentators conclude that the United States is
obligated under international law to release detainees once the
reason for detention has ended.152 This obligation is expressed, among
149. See Satterthwaite, supra note 57, at 1408 (noting the debate over
whether the Geneva Conventions’ guarantees apply to al-Qaida operatives picked
up in Afghanistan).
150. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 466 (2004) (holding that alien
detainees could invoke the federal habeas statute to challenge detention);
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 634 (2006) (plurality opinion) (applying
common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to the conflict with al Qaeda);
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008) (holding that constitutional habeas
corpus protections apply at Guantánamo); see also Carlos Manuel Vásquez, The
Military Commissions Act, the Geneva Conventions, and the Courts: A Critical
Guide, 101 Am. J. Int’l L. 73, 93–94, 96 (2007) (analyzing the court decisions in
the detention cases and the executive’s response); Landau, supra note 53, at 661
(describing and analyzing the interplay between courts and the executive in the
detention cases).
151. Cf. Helton, supra note 3, at 2336–39 (considering the content of the right
against “arbitrary and prolonged” detention in the immigration context).
152. Id. at 2338 n.19 (“All of the major human rights instruments recognize a
right not to be arbitrarily detained by the state.”) (citing human rights
instruments: American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov.
22, 1969, art. 7(3), O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143, 147 (entered into force
July 18, 1978) [hereinafter American Convention] (“No one shall be subject to
arbitrary arrest or imprisonment.”); ICCPR, supra note 118, art. 9(1),
999 U.N.T.S. 171, 175 (“Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.”); European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, art. 5(3), Europ. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221,
226 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter European Convention] (stating
that anyone arrested or detained “shall be brought promptly before a judge or
other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to
trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial”); UDHR, supra note
115, art. 9 (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.”));
see also Daryl L. Hecht, Controlling the Executive’s Power to Detain Aliens
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other places, in Article 75 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions,
which provides that all detainees held in connection with armed
conflict “shall be released with the minimum delay possible and in
any event as soon as the circumstances justifying the arrest,
detention or internment have ceased to exist.”153 The Third Geneva
Convention, governing the detention and treatment of prisoners of
war, provides that detained combatants “shall be released and
repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.”154
The Fourth Geneva Convention, governing the treatment of civilians
in interstate conflicts, similarly requires release, this time even
before the end of active hostilities: “as soon as the reasons which
necessitated . . . internment no longer exist.” 155 Finally, and in
Offshore: What Process is Due the Guantánamo Prisoners?, 50 S.D. L. Rev. 78,
101 & n.209 (2005) (indicating that freedom from arbitrary detention is a widely
recognized right).
153. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June
8, 1977, art. 75, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 37 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter
Protocol I]; see also Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 634 (finding that Article 75 is
“indisputably part of the customary international law”). The Kiyemba
international law amici noted that although Article 75 is not itself binding on the
United States, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention is binding. Int’l Law
Amici, supra note 118, at 2 (citing Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3518, 75
U.N.T.S. 287, 288 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter Fourth Geneva
Convention]). Common Article 3 requires that detainees be “treated humanely.”
Id. The international law amici argue that in light of Article 75, “humane”
treatment includes the requirement that detainees be promptly released “as soon
as the circumstances justifying the arrest, detention or internment have ceased to
exist.” Id. But see Chesney, supra note 108, at 736–37 (arguing that the
particular circumstances of the Guantánamo detainees do not trigger any of the
provisions of the Geneva Convention concerning detainee transfers).
154. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug.
12, 1949, art. 118, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 92, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 224 (entered into force Oct.
21, 1950) [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]. The injunction to release and
repatriate detainees without delay attaches regardless of whether there is a
formal peace treaty or armistice. Id.; Int’l Law Amici, supra note 118, at 29
(stating that the official commentary of the International Committee of the Red
Cross (“ICRC”) “interprets this provision as providing prisoners of war with ‘an
inalienable right’ to repatriation and establishing a duty for detaining authorities
to ‘carry out repatriation and to provide the necessary means for it to take
place.’”) (citing 3 Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Commentary: Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 546 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960)).
155. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 153, at art. 132, 6 U.S.T. 3516,
3606, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 376 (“Each interned person shall be released by the
Detaining Power as soon as the reasons which necessitated his internment no
longer exist.”). To ensure that civilian detainees are not detained longer than
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addition to the Geneva Convention requirements, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights mandates prompt release of detainees,
stating that “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention
or exile,” 156 and directing that an “effective remedy” should be
available if the detention is found to violate the law.157
The United States exploits these uncertainties: What
constitutes the cessation of active hostilities? When has the reason
for detention ended? By conducting an ill-defined and borderless “war
against terror,” the United States evades laws triggered by the
end of a conflict. 158 By maintaining a blanket “enemy combatant”
designation long after admitting that many detainees were civilians
swept up in error, the United States invokes the more permissive
detention laws applicable to combatants. 159 Further, by “clearing”
detainees for release, the executive has signaled its conclusion that
further detention is not justified, yet it continues to buy time by
claiming that detention is not prolonged and arbitrary while the
United States is making good-faith diplomatic efforts to resettle the
detainees.160
The maneuvering outlined above reflects the U.S. executive’s
attempt to cope with a quandary of its own making. The executive’s
legal strategies constitute an effort to save face before domestic
courts and on the international stage and to continue to detain the
refugee detainees while resettlement solutions are identified and
negotiated.

necessary, the Fourth Geneva Convention requires that detaining authorities
provide detained individuals with a semi-annual review of the basis for detention.
Id. art. 43, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3544, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 314 (requiring review for
detained aliens “at least twice yearly”); Id. art. 78, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3568, 75
U.N.T.S. 287, 338 (requiring review for detained civilians “if possible every six
months”). When the detaining authority finds that the detention is no longer
warranted, the detention must end. See Int’l Law Amici, supra note 118, at 33
(citing 4 Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Commentary: Geneva Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 261 (Jean S. Pictet ed.,
1958)). If the civilian detention continues to the close of hostilities, it must end
“as soon as possible” afterwards. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 153, art.
133, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3608, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 378.
156. UDHR, supra note 115, art. 9.
157. Id. art. 8 (“Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the
competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted
him by the constitution or by law.”).
158. See Satterthwaite, supra note 57, at 1417–18 & n.436.
159. See Int’l Law Amici, supra note 118, at 34–35.
160. Press Release, supra note 47; Int’l Law Amici, supra note 118, at 34–35.
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B. Moral Risk
Whether or not the United States can legally defend its right
to continue to detain the refugee detainees, the almost decade-long
detention of individuals who have never been charged violates the
spirit of the law. Detainees who have spent nine years in detention,
some of it in solitary confinement, have been the most obvious
casualties of the U.S. resettlement quagmire. 161 Moreover, the
executive’s quasi-legal approach to resettlement of Guantánamo’s
refugee detainees creates an incentive for behavior that sacrifices the
dignity and humanity of those detainees.
The secrecy surrounding the resettlement process creates an
environment of fear. The United States’ “policy” of non-refoulement
without an obligation to announce which detainees it considers to be
refugees allows it to retain maximum “operational flexibility.”162
When the United States does not conduct a refugee status
determination to clearly establish that a detainee is a refugee, it is
accountable only to its own soft non-refoulement policy, not the hardlaw obligations enshrined in the Refugee and Torture Conventions. A
secretive process enables the executive to return marginal
cases—detainees for whom refugee status is not so clear as to be
publicly apparent—and to freely change course as to whether it

161. Sabin Willett, counsel to Huzaifa, a Uighur detainee, describes the
conditions in “Camp Six,” where his client and other detainees were held for
many years:
The men call it the “dungeon above the ground.” Each lives
alone in an isolation cell. There is no natural light or air. There
is no way to tell whether it is day or night. . . . For 2 hours in
24, the MPs shackle and lead Huzaifa to the rec[reation] area.
This is a two-story chimney, about four meters square. It is
your only chance to talk to another human being or see the
sun. But the rec[reation] time might be at night. It might be
after midnight. Weeks go by during which you never see the
sun at all. . . . In the cell, he can crouch at his door. He can yell
through the crack at the bottom. The guy in the next cell might
actually hear him if he is not curled and facing the wall in a
fetal position. Another Uighur told us of the voices in the head.
The voices were getting the better of him, he said. His foot was
tapping on the floor as he said this to me. I don’t know what
has happened to him. He doesn’t come out of the cell to see us
anymore. Huzaifa believes he will die in Guantánamo. He told
us to tell his wife to consider that he has died and remarry.
Willett, supra note 21, at 31–32.
162. Rendition, supra note 100, at 457.

734

COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[42:697

will return certain detainees.163 These possibilities are undoubtedly
valuable to the executive, but they come at the expense of the refugee
detainees who do not know whether they will be returned to a place
where they fear torture or worse.164 For example, in a pleading before
a federal district court, one Algerian detainee petitioned for an
emergency administrative stay of transfer on the ground that
petitioner’s counsel had heard that the U.S. Attorney General
was scheduled to meet with the Algerian Minister of Justice.165 The
detainee turned to the court for an administrative stay just in
case the meeting “may presage his early transfer to Algeria.”166 The
government scoffed at the implication, dismissing the concern as
“unfounded speculation,” but did so without denying that the
detainee’s transfer would be considered at the meeting.167 As is clear
from this pleading, the government’s secrecy caused the detainee to
live with an ear to the ground, in fear that news of a government
meeting could lead to a transfer with potentially devastating
consequences.168
A system in which the United States refuses to recognize that
some detainees are refugees also allows those detainees to become
pawns in a political game. For example, the United States listed the
Uighurs’ political organization on a watchlist in order to garner
China’s support for U.S. Iraq policy. 169 The department of defense
later allowed China to interview those detainees when it needed
further political favors. 170 If the United States had performed a
refugee status determination and determined that the Uighurs could
163. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
164. The lack of transparency also hinders the executive’s ability to facilitate
transfers. A transparent system would allow the executive to marshal all
governmental and non-governmental actors to broker the best solution, rather
than entrusting the task to one small government office with limited external
input.
165. See Belbacha Motion, supra note 16, at 1.
166. Id. at 4.
167. Id.
168. Id. (concluding that the detainee “can only raise a concern, because only
the government knows. But for Mr. Belbacha, the impending meeting is ominous.
Where there is smoke, there may be fire. Mr. Belbacha cannot afford to wait to
see how it all turns out”).
169. Brief of Petitioners at 5–6, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010)
(No. 08-1234).
170. Id. (citing Office of Inspector General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, A Review of
the FBI’s Involvement in and Observations of Detainee Interrogations in
Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, and Iraq 183–84 & n.134 (2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0805/final.pdf).
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not be returned to China, they could not have used those detainees as
pawns in political gamesmanship.171

C. Political Cost
The legal and moral errors that the United States makes in
failing to release and resettle the refugee detainees drains the
country’s political capital. Today, the government provides generous
“living privileges” for habeas-cleared detainees, but this change
follows nine years of abuse and inhumane treatment, which was
noted around the world.172 Additionally, the United States creates the
perception that it is a rule-breaker by failing to (i) conduct refugee
status determinations, (ii) accept any detainees for resettlement in
the United States, or (iii) release detainees after proclaiming that the
reason for their detention has ended.173 If the United States makes
the poor decision to transfer a refugee to persecution or torture,
international scrutiny and political backlash could intensify.
The political costs of the U.S. approach defeat the United
States’ own goals—to resettle the detainees and close
Guantánamo—because those goals are dependant on international
cooperation. Now that the United States needs assistance from
foreign states to resettle refugee detainees, it faces understandable
resistance. As a result, the United States is forced to spend its
political capital on persuading other states to provide solutions to a
refugee problem that the United States itself has created and
continues to perpetuate. The United States’ difficulty in concluding
the resettlement process delays closing Guantánamo, which further

171. Additionally, a process by which the United States peddles detainees
around the world depends on the United States’ capacity to “sell” detainees to
foreign states, raising concerns about the commoditization of the refugee
detainees. See Temporary Protection, supra note 4, at 287 (noting the
“commodification” concern when the system is left to political bargaining rather
than legal standards).
172. See, e.g., Sarah Mendelson, The Guantánamo Countdown, Foreign
Policy, Oct. 1, 2009, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/
10/01/the_guantanamo_countdown [hereinafter Mendelson] (stating that
Guantánamo symbolized controversial U.S. counterterrorism policies).
173. See supra notes 71–99 and accompanying text; Manel, supra note 71; see
also Germany’s Guests, supra note 81 (quoting Special Envoy Fried: “It is fair to
say, as just an objective statement, that the U.S. could resettle more detainees,
had we been willing to take in some . . . .”). According to the German press, in
order to secure Germany’s cooperation with detainee resettlement, the U.S. had
to at least agree to consider taking some detainees. Id.
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harms the U.S. reputation—thus, ironically, creating further
resettlement delays.174

IV. PROPOSING A THIRD WAY: A ROLE FOR THE UNHCR
Criticisms of the United States’ management of the refugee
problem in Guantánamo outlined in Part III flow in large part from
the United States’ reluctance to submit refugee detainees to
international and domestic law mechanisms. Ideally, the United
States would comply with the Refugee Convention’s requirement that
each potential refugee in Guantánamo be afforded a refugee status
determination. Under the Refugee Convention, if a detainee is found
to be a “refugee” and is neither excludable nor expellable, the
executive should grant asylum or withhold removal in the United
States until it is possible to repatriate the detainee. 175 In such a
utopian scenario, the United States would have performed the review
and completed the transfer immediately after each detainee was
“cleared for release,” so as to comply with the Geneva Convention’s
prohibition on arbitrary detention. This would have had positive
international political effects, saved the executive branch
174. See, e.g., Shephard, supra note 72, at IN1 (stating that President
Obama’s announcement that the administration would close Guantánamo “was a
very important building block for the Obama Administration . . . The Obama
campaign, and then the administration, staked a lot on turning the page on those
counterterrorism policies”). Moreover, the United States’ success in refugee
resettlement depends in part on the country’s political clout at any given time
and international goodwill towards the United States. The Obama administration
resettled 20 refugees in the administration’s first six months, while under the six
years of the Bush administration only eight detainees were given refuge, and
they all went to Albania. Id.
175. See supra Part III.A (discussing that release is required at cessation of
active hostilities or when reason for detention has ended); Int’l Law Amici, supra
note 118, at 14–15; see also Kara Simard, Note, Innocent at Guantanamo Bay:
Granting Political Asylum to Unlawfully Detained Uighur Muslims, 30 Suffolk
Transnat’l L. Rev. 365, 398 (2006–07) (arguing that the Uighurs should be
granted asylum in the United States). Under U.S. immigration laws, the United
States could choose to withhold removal without granting asylum and allow
refugees to remain in detention until an alternate solution is found, Helton supra
note 3, at 2337 (stating that detention is permitted to facilitate removal),
although at some point the detention becomes “prolonged and arbitrary” under
international law standards, and must end. Id. (examining parameters of
prohibition against “prolonged arbitrary” detention in the immigration context).
In the Guantánamo context, additional U.S. Geneva Convention obligations
apply, because the detainees are held as wartime combatants. The United States
conceded that it is not holding the detainees under immigration laws. See Brief of
Respondents at 19, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 U.S. 1235 (2010) (08-1234).
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international political capital, facilitated a quicker end to the chapter
of U.S. history shadowed by Guantánamo, and demonstrated U.S.
commitment to international law and institutions—thereby
supporting the U.S. claim to global moral leadership.176
The United States’ failure to follow such a model approach
resulted partly from the political challenge of convincing the U.S.
public to accept detainees labeled as “enemy combatants,” with
perceived connections to terrorism and the events of September 11,
2001. 177 The failure may also have been due to real or perceived
security concerns, or mere lack of political will. 178 These historical
questions are beyond the scope of this Article. Because no change in
course has occurred over the many years since the first detainees
were cleared for release—despite President Obama’s campaign
promise to close Guantánamo—this Article assumes that the U.S.
executive branch will not change course in the future.179 This Article
also sets aside the question of whether the United States could be
coerced or incentivized to deal on its own with Guantánamo’s refugee
detainees in an ideal manner.
This Article proposes a third way, which charts the territory
between the current U.S. approach and full compliance with domestic
and international law. According to this third way, the United States
should solicit and obtain assistance from the UNHCR.180 It is within
the mandate of the UNHCR to perform refugee status

176. See Taylor, supra note 70 (“In the eyes of the world the [Guantánamo]
prison has come to exemplify harsh U.S. anti-terror tactics and detention without
trial[.]”).
177. See id. (quoting Senator John Thune: “The American people don’t want
these men walking the streets of America’s neighborhoods. . . . [or] held at a
military base or federal prison in their backyard”).
178. See id. (quoting FBI Director Robert Mueller as reporting to Congress
his “concern” that “Guantánamo detainees could support terrorism if sent to the
United States”).
179. See Mendelson, supra note 172.
180. The Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism also suggested
that the UNHCR participate in the resettlement of Guantánamo’s detainees,
although this proposal has so far gone without notice in the academic literature.
See Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, Statement Delivered to the
General Assembly, Third Committee, U.N. DOC. A/62/263 (Oct. 29, 2007)
[herinafter Special Rapporteur] (recommending that the UNHCR “be involved in
the resettlement of Guantánamo detainees claiming to be in need of international
protection,” including by conducting status definitions and assisting with
resettlement).
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determinations for Guantánamo detainees and to broker agreements
with foreign states to secure asylum for those who are refugees.
UNHCR participation would be effective in resolving many of the
Guantánamo refugee resettlement problems outlined in Part III.
Specifically, UNHCR assistance would help the United States out of
the bind that its current policies and legal strategies cannot easily
resolve and would also help protect the moral and political goods
threatened by the current U.S. approach.
Because the United States has resettled many Guantánamo
refugee detainees through its arduous peddling process, it has missed
the opportunity to capture the benefits that UNHCR participation
from an earlier stage would have afforded. Nonetheless, several
dozen refugees remain detained, and as one commentator has noted,
the final refugee cases are likely to be the most intractable.181 The
UNHCR could assist the United States to resolve these cases.

A. The UNHCR as Assistant
The UNHCR has a broad mandate to assist the international
community in protecting refugee rights, and does so in many
different capacities around the globe. The UNHCR functions
primarily as an assistant to sovereign states, not as a police or
watchdog entity.182
The United Nations’ General Assembly established the
UNHCR in 1950—just after the flows of World War II refugees and
just prior to the adoption of the Refugee Convention—to assist
governments in carrying out their obligations to protect refugees
under then-existing international instruments.183 The UNHCR was
mandated to serve:
[T]he function of providing international protection,
under the auspices of the United Nations, to refugees
who fall within the scope of the [UNHCR] Statute
and of seeking permanent solutions for the problem of
refugees by assisting Governments and, subject to the
181. See Shephard, supra note 72, at IN1 (“While no deal has been easy for
Fried, the final few cases will likely pose the most problems—and could derail
closing the prison.”).
182. See Pallis, supra note 111, at 887 (“States . . . are regarded as the powerwielders, with the UNHCR acting as the trustee who will perform the duties of
office faithfully.”); Donkoh, supra note 5, at 265 (noting that the UNHCR’s role in
refugee protection is to be “a facilitator,” while states are the implementers of
refugee protection).
183. See Goodwin-Gill, supra note 105, at 7–15.
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approval of the Governments concerned, private
organizations to facilitate the voluntary repatriation
of such refugees, or their assimilation within new
national communities.184
The UNHCR now manages refugee flows under the
Refugee Convention, the Protocol, and regional agreements. 185 The
organization articulates its mandate as “safeguard[ing] the rights
and wellbeing of refugees, to lead and coordinate international action
for their worldwide protection and . . . seek[ing] permanent solutions
to their plight.”186
Among other tasks, the UNHCR conducts refugee status
determinations required by the Convention’s non-refoulement
provision, and assists with resettling detainees when a host state is

184. Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, G.A. Res. 428(V), U.N. Doc A/1775 (Dec. 14, 1950) [hereinafter UNHCR
Statute]; see also Memorandum, UNHCR Advisory Committee, Memorandum By
The High Commissioner On Certain Problems Relating To The Eligibility of
Refugees (Conference Room Doc. No. 1) (Nov. 15, 1951), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/4419921c2.html [hereinafter UNHCR Advisory Committee,
Memorandum] (outlining UNHCR’s obligations under the statute); Goodwin-Gill,
supra note 105, at 7–8 (explaining that the UNHCR’s mandate is determined by
its statute, by resolutions of the General Assembly, and by the U.N. Economic
and Social Council).
185. Refugee Convention, supra note 3; Protocol, supra note 3; see also
UNHCR,
History
of
UNHCR:
A Global Humanitarian Organization
of Humble Origins, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646cbc.html [hereinafter
History] (explaining the Refugee Convention as “the basic statute guiding
UNHCR’s work” and stating that the UNHCR also works to safeguard the
protections afforded by the Protocol and other agreements).
186. Ninette Kelley, et al., UNHCR Evaluation & Policy Analysis Unit,
Enhancing UNHCR’s Capacity to Monitor the Protection, Rights and Well-Being
of
Refugees,
at
17,
EPAU/2004/06
(June
2004),
available
at
http://www.unhcr.org/40d9781d4.pdf; see also UNHCR, An Introduction to
International Protection, Protecting Persons of Concern to UNHCR, at 1, 7
(Aug. 1, 2005), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4214cb4f2.html
(“UNHCR’s mandate is to provide, on a non-political and humanitarian basis,
international protection to refugees and to seek permanent solutions for them”;
“[UNHCR] States have the primary responsibility for protecting refugees . . . [The
UNHCR] works to ensure that governments take all actions necessary to protect
refugees, asylum-seekers and other persons of concern who are on their territory
or who are seeking admission . . . [and] also strives to secure durable solutions for
refugees . . . .”); Won Kidane, An Injury to the Citizen, A Pleasure to the State: A
Peculiar Challenge to the Enforcement of International Refugee Law, 6 Chi.-Kent
J. Int’l & Comp. L. 116, 176 (2006) (“As far as refugees are concerned, the
UNHCR is . . . the only possible substitute for the traditional diplomatic
protection that states provide to their citizens in foreign lands.”).
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overwhelmed by refugee flows or requests assistance.187 The UNHCR
manages refugee camps, issues travel papers, tracks refugee flows,
and performs many other functions, holding itself responsible to the
international community “for all aspects of the complete life-cycle of a
refugee situation.”188
Under the terms of the UNHCR Statute, the organization
carries out its mandate by working with and by the permission of
state governments, serving “at all times in close collaboration
with Governments, and frequently through them.”189 The UNHCR is
charged with formulating refugee policies by facilitating state action,
rather than by acting independently.190
In practice, the UNHCR is highly deferential to state parties.
The organization negotiates agreements with individual states that
outline the tasks the UNHCR is entrusted to perform under the
agreement, and will generally confine its activities in a State to the
terms of the negotiated agreement. 191 In some states, the UNHCR
187. See UNHCR Advisory Committee, Memorandum, supra note 184, at 4
(announcing the High Commissioner’s conclusion that it is within the
UNHCR’s mandate to conduct refugee status determinations); UNHCR,
Partnership: An Operations Management Handbook for UNHCR’s
Partners, 1.5 subsec. 1 (Feb. 2003), available at http://www.unhcr.org/4a39f7706.
html [hereinafter Partnership]; see also Pallis, supra note 111, at 877 (noting that
the UNHCR has engaged in a “tacit quid pro quo” with states that have trouble
bearing the high financial cost of conducting refugee status determinations
whereby the UNHCR conducts the determinations in exchange for accession by
the state to international refugee conventions, with the result that “while most
western states conduct refugee status determinations for themselves, the
UNHCR conducts it in many of the poorest states of the world”). The UNHCR
conducts refugee status determinations in 80 countries worldwide, processing at
least 75,000 asylum applications in 2004. Id.
188. UNHCR, Partnership, supra note 187, at 1.5 subsec. 1.
189. UNHCR Advisory Committee, Memorandum, supra note 184, at 1; see
also UNHCR Statute, supra note 184.
190. UNHCR Advisory Committee, Memorandum, supra note 184, at 1
(explaining that the UNHCR was not designed to “take the place of the authority
of States in the field of refugee policy” but to support them).
191. See Pallis, supra note 111, at 881–82 (finding that these agreements
often “govern refugee status determination and make explicit reference to the
tasks which the UNHCR is entrusted to perform” in a given State); see also Ralph
Wilde, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?: Why and How UNHCR Governance of
‘Development’ Refugee Camps Should Be Subject to International Human Rights
Law, 1 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J. 107, 119–20 (1998) (noting that “there is no
limit on the sorts of obligations that can be included, and they may well include
the UNHCR’s own guidelines,” which may interpret international norms
differently in different contexts). In a Memorandum issued shortly after the
Refugee Convention was adopted, the High Commissioner concluded that, under
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will assume essentially all refugee-processing functions, including
performing refugee status determinations.192 In others, the UNHCR
performs only a few general functions, such as publicizing refugee
issues and fundraising.193 The UNHCR’s deference to state parties is
influenced by the fact that it is funded by many of the states it
assists.194 Commentators point out that this funding structure gives
the UNHCR incentive to refrain from confrontational behavior.195 For
example, while the UNHCR is empowered to review State action,
including reviewing a host state’s basis for denying individual
refugee petitions, the organization rarely performs these functions or
criticizes the actions of host states for fear of jeopardizing funding
sources.196
The UNHCR’s cooperation with state parties for the
protection of refugees was designed to be a reciprocal arrangement.
The U.N. General Assembly Resolution instituting the UNHCR
called upon states to “recognize the High Commissioner’s right to act
and mediate on behalf of refugees” and to “assist him in his work.”197
In Article 35(1) of the Refugee Convention, signatory states
committed to cooperate with the UNHCR:
The contracting states undertake to cooperate with
the Office of the [UNHCR], or any other agency of the
United Nations which may succeed it, in the exercise
the UNHCR Statute, the UNHCR could conclude agreements with States who
wished to solicit UNHCR assistance with various tasks. UNHCR Advisory
Committee, Memorandum, supra note 184, at 2 (“In accordance with the terms of
Article 8b of his Statute, interested Governments are at liberty to seek the cooperation of the High Commissioner, in an agreement which would define the
particular services which they may wish to entrust to his Office.”).
192. See Wilde, supra note 191, at 119–20.
193. For instance, in North America, the UNHCR “monitors and supports
national refugee protection mechanisms, builds awareness of the rights of
refugees and asylum-seekers, and seeks to secure political and financial support
for its operations.” UNHCR, 2010 Regional Operations Profile: North America
and the Caribbean, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e492086
(last visited Feb. 24, 2011); see also supra note 187 and accompanying text.
194. The United States leads the world in financial contributions to the
UNHCR. In 2009, the United States contributed US $641 million to the UNHCR.
UNHCR, Government Contributions to UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e492086 (last visited Mar. 9, 2011).
195. See Kidane, supra note 186, at 176–77 (“Evidently, however, the
UNHCR’s existing obligations, coupled with a fear of endangering relations with
host governments, has had a significant impact on the UNHCR’s ability to
supervise the due implementation of the Convention.”).
196. Id.
197. UNHCR Statute, supra note 184.
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of its functions, and shall in particular facilitate its
duty of supervising the application of the provisions
of this convention.198
Before the establishment of the UNHCR, direct state-to-state
agreements concerning refugee resettlement were common. 199 Now
the UNHCR carries out the bulk of refugee resettlement, referring
refugees to various states for resettlement according to the
specifications of each state.200 Although there is nothing to prohibit
states from concluding direct state-to-state agreements, in practice
this occurs in a very small number of cases.201 Most states now refer
resettlement issues to the UNHCR, and accept refugees only on
referral from the UNHCR or through domestic processes.202

B. The UNHCR in Guantánamo
In a 2007 report to the U.N. General Assembly, the Special
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism (“Special
Rapporteur”) recommended that the UNHCR should be involved in
the resettlement of Guantánamo detainees claiming to be in need of
protection from resettlement to their countries of origin. The Special
198. Refugee Convention, supra note 3, art. 35(1).
199. See Goodwin-Gill, supra note 105, at 7–18; Temporary Protection, supra
note 4, at 280–81 (noting that when pressured the international community
resorts to “a traditional model of reciprocal international obligation”).
200. Memorandum to Interested Guantánamo Legal Teams Regarding
Potential Mechanisms for Obtaining Third-State Resettlement for Detainees with
Viable Refugee/Torture Claims from Susan Akram, Clinical Professor, Boston
University Civil Litigation Program, at 2 (Oct. 5, 2005) (on file with Author)
(describing strategies for how detainees with putative refugee claims might have
such claims reviewed by third states for possible resettlement); see, e.g., New
Zealand Resisted US Requests To Take Guantanamo Refuges, New Zealand
Herald, Aug. 21, 2007, available at http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/
article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10458944 [herinafter New Zealand] (reporting that
New Zealand refused a U.S. request to accept detainees because the detainees
were not referred by the UNHCR).
201. See Akram, supra note 200 (explaining that states will commit to
making a certain number of refugee slots available and will sometimes designate
a preferred category of refugee population, such as unaccompanied minors,
humanitarian cases, or single women without families). In 2009, the UNHCR
employed a staff of 6,650 members working in 118 countries, with a budget of US
$2 billion to carry out this task. See UNHCR, History, supra note 185. The
number of people under UNHCR supervision that year amounted to a total of
34.4 million, including displaced people, refugees, returnees, stateless people, and
asylum seekers. See id.
202. See Akram, supra note 200.
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Rapporteur recommended that this involvement include refugee
status determinations, or “an assessment, including through
confidential interviews, of the situation of each individual detainee,”
and assistance with resettlement. 203 The advice of the Special
Rapporteur has fallen on deaf ears.
Resettlement of Guantánamo’s refugee detainees differs from
the standard resettlement cases. First, the United States is solely
responsible for the fact that the refugees are within U.S. jurisdiction
and control, and second, the burden to the United States is not in the
size, urgency, or economic cost of the refugee situation, but in the fact
that resettling the detainees poses a domestic political problem. Yet
neither of these differences prevent the UNHCR from assisting the
United States in solving the Guantánamo refugee issues. The
UNHCR has wide latitude under its statute, and its roles around the
world are varied and flexible; state parties craft agreements that are
suitable to their needs.204 The United States could choose to entrust
both the conduct of refugee status determinations and coordination of
resettlement entirely to the UNHCR, or it could retain some control
over the process. The United States and the UNHCR could agree
upon terms that are reasonable in the Guantánamo context. Despite
the benefits and flexibility of UNHCR involvement, however, the
United States has not heeded the Special Rapporteur’s
recommendation to invite the UNHCR to assist in Guantánamo.205
The section that follows explains why the U.S. failure to extend this
invitation is unfortunate. Rather than causing the United States to
sacrifice its national interests for the greater good, UNHCR
participation would in fact further U.S. national interests. This
solution would also provide other benefits, such as protecting
detainee rights and furthering the legitimacy of international refugee
law.

1. Benefits to the United States
The United States should solicit and obtain UNHCR
assistance in order to accomplish its own goals. Delegating to the
UNHCR the responsibility to conduct refugee status determinations
and negotiate on behalf of detainees for resettlement in foreign states
would enable the United States to close Guantánamo more swiftly
and with fewer political costs.
203. Special Rapporteur, supra note 180, at 4.
204. See supra Part IV.A.
205. See Akram, supra note 200.
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The UNHCR’s designation of a detainee as a “refugee” and
referral of the detainee for resettlement would carry legitimacy the
United States cannot replicate. As discussed in Part II, supra, the
United States engages in double-speak in connection with the
detainees.206 On the one hand, the U.S. executive refuses to withdraw
“enemy combatant” status designations207 and to accept detainees for
resettlement in the United States.208 On the other hand, it compiles
sympathetic profiles for detainees it wishes to resettle—outlining
detainees’ life experiences, family connections and pacifist
sentiments—and reassures potential resettlement countries by
touting stories about the successful integration of detainees
resettled elsewhere. 209 Given this context, even a formal refugee
status determination by the United States would be perceived as
little more than another hand to be played in the resettlement game.
The UNHCR, by contrast, is experienced and politically neutral.210 A
UNHCR determination that a detainee is a refugee and safe for
resettlement would carry authority.
UNHCR participation in the status determination process
would not pose a meaningful challenge to U.S. interests in national
security or sovereignty. As for security, the status determination
206. See supra Parts II.B.1, II.C.
207. See supra Part II.B.1.
208. See Taylor, supra note 70 (reporting that FBI Director Robert Mueller
testified before Congress about his “concern” that Guantánamo detainees could
support terrorism if sent to the United States).
209. In addition to conflicting motivations, the double-speak may also be due
to crossed signals between the Department of Defense, which attempts to justify
continued detention of the detainees in court and elsewhere, and the State
Department, which is responsible for persuading foreign states that the detainees
are safe for resettlement. In Sabin Willett’s testimony before Congress, he
pointed out that the State Department’s difficulty in resettling detainees was due
in part to the fact that U.S. statements have instilled fear. Willett, supra note 21,
at 1 (“[O]ur allies read the same shrill rhetoric about Guantánamo that you have
read.”); see also Worthington, Finding New Homes, supra note 86 (reporting that
the United States freely reveals to potential host states facts in detainee files that
suggest that the detainees may be potentially dangerous, even when those facts
are suspect, unsubstantiated, or the product of bribery or torture). Chesney also
notes the duality of the U.S. approach, framing the Guantánamo transfer
paradigm as a “clash between competing interests that neither side can simply
dismiss.” Chesney, supra note 107, at 746. The “clash” results from the military’s
need for “sufficient latitude” to decide against repatriation given U.S. legal and
moral obligations to prevent torture and the government’s diplomatic need to
negotiate transfers to home states. Id.
210. See UNHCR, Partnership, supra note 187; Pallis, supra note 111, at 910
(emphasizing that the UNHCR is non-political).
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process would require nothing more than an interview with each
potential refugee detainee in Guantánamo by UNHCR
representatives.211 The United States has invited numerous countries
to Guantánamo to interview detainees when it has served U.S.
political interests to do so, demonstrating that the United States
is equipped to manage any security risks attendant to
such interviews. 212 Inviting the UNHCR to conduct refugee status
determinations does implicate sovereignty concerns: The approach
would obligate the United States to abide by UNHCR refugee
designations and the non-refoulement obligation that those
designations entail. Under current U.S. practice, by contrast, the
United States does not publicly state whether it considers a given
detainee to be a refugee, and so avoids any accountability.213 Without
knowing whether a detainee has a legitimate claim to refugee status,
one cannot know whether repatriation of that detainee constitutes
refoulement. 214 While UNHCR status determinations would impose
accountability, the United States can mitigate the damage by also
inviting the UNHCR to shoulder some of the burden of those

211. See UNHCR Handbook, supra note 11, at para. 28 (setting out the core
elements of the refugee status determination process). Cf. I.N.S. v. CardozaFonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 439 n.22 (1987) (finding that while not legally binding on
U.S. officials, the Handbook provides “significant guidance” in construing the
Protocol and in giving content to the obligations established therein); UNHCR,
Advisory Opinion: Minimum Standards for Refugee Status Determination
Procedures, Oct. 26, 2006 (Letter from UNHCR to Barbara Olshansky, Director
Counsel, Guantánamo Global Justice Initiative) (on file with Author) (explaining
that applicants should receive a personal interview before decision-makers with
the opportunity to present evidence and call witnesses, in conditions which
ensure appropriate confidentiality, and with a legal representative present).
212. For example, the United States invited Chinese officials to come to
Guantánamo to question the Uighurs at a time when President Bush was
attempting to secure the acquiescence of Chinese President Jiang to U.S. Iraq
policy. See Office of Inspector General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, A Review of the
FBI’s Involvement in and Observations of Detainee Interrogations in
Guantánamo Bay, Afghanistan and Iraq, at 183–84 & n.134 (2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0805/final.pdf; see also Brief in Support of
Petitioners at 6, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (08-1234) (citing
White House news release). Nevertheless, the United States denied access to five
U.N. Special Rapporteurs who sought interviews with individual detainees. The
Special Rapporteurs were offered such restricted access that they declined to visit
Guantánamo at all, issuing a scathing report on the situation instead. See U.N.
Commission on Human Rights, Situation of Detainees at Guantánamo Bay,
E/CN.4.2006/120 (Feb. 27, 2006).
213. See supra Part III.B.
214. See supra Part III.A.1.ii.
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designations by assisting with resettling the detainees, as explained
below.
Involvement by the UNHCR in the status determination
process would also eliminate political delicacies that may deter the
United States from making refugee designations. Refugee
scholarship has noted that one state’s designation of another state’s
citizen as a refugee is a politically loaded act.215 A refugee designation
constitutes transparent criticism of another state’s human rights
policies.216 The delicacy is exacerbated for the United States in the
Guantánamo context because some states, such as Algeria, are safe
for some detainees but hazardous for others. 217 Designating some
Algerians as refugees could damage the United States’ attempts to
persuade Algeria to accept other detainees for repatriation on
favorable terms. Since resettlement of Guantánamo detainees is a
matter of global scrutiny, a determination that some detainees are
refugees will not pass unnoticed. If the UNHCR assumes the duty of
determining refugee status, the United States will not have to
answer for those designations.
UNHCR facilitation of refugee detainee resettlement would
benefit the United States by speeding up the process and reducing its
cost. States have no international law obligations to accept refugees
from another state, and direct state-to-state resettlement agreements
are now rare.218 By contrast, state parties to the Refugee Convention
are obligated to assist the UNHCR in carrying out its refugee
protection agenda. 219 In accordance with this mandate, there is a
well-established process by which states accept refugees upon
referral from the UNHCR.220 Many states agree to accept a certain

215. See, e.g., James C. Hathaway, A Reconsideration of the Underlying
Premise of Refugee Law, 31 Harv. Int’l L. J. 129, 145–51 (1990) (arguing that both
Western countries and the Soviet Union saw development of the refugee concept
as an attempt to bolster condemnation of the Soviet bloc); INS v. AguierreAguierre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (noting that recognizing refugees “may affect
our relations with [the refugee’s home] country or its neighbors” and that
“diplomatic repercussions” of refugee determinations are beyond the ken of the
judiciary).
216. See supra Part IV.A.
217. See supra notes 135–137 and accompanying text.
218. Akram, supra note 200; New Zealand, supra note 200 (reporting that
New Zealand refused a U.S. request to accept detainees because the detainees
were not referred by the UNHCR).
219. Refugee Convention, supra note 3, art. 35; Protocol, supra note 3,
art. 11; see also supra Part IV.A.
220. See id.
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quota of refugees from the UNHCR each year. 221 UNHCR referral
would thus give states an incentive to accept Guantánamo detainees,
since the detainees would make up part of their quota.222 The United
States can offer no similar incentive and must use other methods of
persuasion. Although the details of the state-to-state detainee
resettlement agreements in the Guantánamo context are not made
public, it is safe to assume that the costs to the United
States—stated or implied—are significant. The UNHCR could appeal
to states to fulfill duties to the international community under
Refugee Convention ideals, minimizing the reliance on political
favors, clout, or goodwill toward the United States.
By facilitating resettlement, UNHCR assistance would help
the United States out of its bind. The executive could make good on
promises to close Guantánamo and reap domestic political approval
from that achievement without being forced to resettle detainees on
U.S. soil. Although the United States may be able to accomplish
these goals without UNHCR assistance, UNHCR participation would
have many advantages and few risks. Moreover, UNHCR
involvement in the resettlement process could help the United States
meet its international obligations, by ensuring that the refugees
receive the status determinations required by the Refugee
Convention, and by facilitating a swifter satisfaction of the United
States’ Geneva Convention obligation to release detainees as soon as
the reason for their detention has ended. Submission of some
autonomy to an international body would signal to the international
community that although the United States is unable or unwilling to
accept detainees for resettlement, it nevertheless considers itself to
be committed to the rule of law and international ideals enshrined in
the Refugee Convention. The suggested approach, in combination
with other foreign policy and rule-of-law-related changes, would help
the United States to regain moral standing lost on account of
Guantánamo abuses, and reclaim the international political benefits
of being perceived as a rule-abider.223

221. Id.
222. See, e.g., New Zealand, supra note 200 (reporting that New Zealand had
already committed to accepting a quota of refugees from the UNHCR and would
not take Guantánamo detainees).
223. See Interview by George Stephanopoulos with President-elect Barack
Obama, ABC News (Jan. 11, 2009) (quoting President-elect Obama as
acknowledging that closing Guantánamo is necessary to regaining standing
internationally: “We are going to close Guantánamo . . . . That is not only the
right thing to do, but it actually has to be part of our broader national security
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In sum, UNHCR assistance would be valuable to the United
States in carrying out difficult resettlements, emptying Guantánamo
of cleared detainees as quickly as possible in compliance with
international law, and allowing the United States to begin regaining
the political capital the Guantánamo issue has drained.224

2. Benefits to Detainees and Foreign States
A swifter detainee resettlement process would clearly benefit
any refugee detainees who leave Guantánamo sooner by enabling
them to begin new lives in freedom months or years earlier. 225 A
UNHCR-facilitated refugee status determination process would
safeguard refugees against refoulement, especially in light of the U.S.
commitment to respect the non-refoulement norm. The UNHCR
status determinations would also eliminate incentives to the
United States to engage in a cloak-and-dagger approach to
resettlement—peddling detainees to third countries while refusing to
designate them as refugees just in case it might eventually decide to
repatriate them to home countries.226 Likewise, involvement by the
UNHCR would minimize the extent to which detainee resettlement
could be used as a political bargaining chip, commoditizing refugee
detainees.227 Entrusting the process to the UNHCR would further
benefit detainees by increasing the transparency of the process, so

strategy, because we will send a message to the world that we are serious about
our values”).
224. Indeed, had the United States solicited UNHCR assistance earlier in the
process President Obama may have been able to meet commitments to close
Guantánamo within a year of his inauguration. See Executive Order, supra note
13, at 4898 (“The detention facilities at Guantánamo for individuals covered by
this order shall be closed as soon as practicable, and no later than 1 year from the
date of this order.”); see also Christina Bellatoni, Obama Sees Campaign
Promises Fade, Wash. Times, Jan. 11, 2009, http://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2009/jan/11/obama-sees-campaign-promises-fade/?page=1
(noting
that
President-elect Obama retreated from an earlier campaign promise to close the
facility within 100 days of his inauguration).
225. This benefit could extend to cleared detainees who are not entitled to
“refugee” status under the Convention but who are also in need of international
assistance, such as detainees who are stateless, or who are excluded from
Refugee Convention protections because they have committed a crime. See supra
Part III.A.1.a. (listing Refugee Convention exclusions); Special Rapporteur, supra
note 180, at 1–4 (recommending that UNHCR assist persons who are not refugees
but who need international protection).
226. For a critique of the “cloak-and-dagger” approach, see supra Part II.C.
227. See Temporary Protection, supra note 4, at 287 (noting commoditization
concern).
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detainees are not forced to live in constant fear of repatriation to
persecution at the hands of a hostile country of origin. UNHCR
assistance would also benefit foreign states that accept detainees for
resettlement, since working with the UNHCR would reduce the
political consequences of accepting Guantánamo detainees.228

C. Critiques
There are several possible criticisms of the proposed
UNHCR-facilitated approach. First, enlisting UNHCR assistance
could threaten U.S. sovereignty interests. The United States has a
historic reluctance to submit to international law—why make an
exception here?229 The answer is that the UNHCR is motivated to be
deferential to U.S. interests because the United States is the
UNHCR’s top funder worldwide. 230 Additionally, the United States
does not submit itself to any additional enforcement measures by
securing UNHCR assistance: The only enforcement mechanism
under the Refugee Convention is state referral to the International
Court of Justice (“ICJ”). No state has ever been referred to the ICJ
for Refugee Convention violations, however, and the UNHCR does
not have the power to make this referral. 231 Finally, the United
States has demonstrated by extensive resettlement efforts that it will
go to great lengths to make good on its policy against nonrefoulement.232
A second possible criticism of the proposed UNHCRfacilitated approach is that the United States would be avoiding its

228. Many states agreed to accept detainees as a form of political favor to the
Obama administration, while fewer detainees were successfully resettled under
the Bush administration. See Shephard, supra note 72, at IN1. With the UNHCR
to broker agreements, states could have accepted refugees during the Bush
administration without fearing that doing so would send a message of approval of
the Bush administration policies. For both administrations, foreign states
criticized the United States for not accepting detainees for resettlement in the
United States, suggesting that the United States should take steps to solve a
problem of its own creation before asking foreign States for help. See supra
Part III. Clearly states are concerned about the possibility that they might signal
approval or support of U.S. policies by offering to accept detainees for
resettlement. See id.
229. See, e.g., Helton, supra note 3, at 2235 (describing how American courts
are wary of looking to international law to uphold the rights of individuals
against violations by governments).
230. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
231. See Kidane, supra note 186, at 176.
232. See supra Part III.A.
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Refugee Convention obligations by placing the burden of
resettlement on the UNHCR. Perhaps the United States should be
forced to clean up its own mess. Given that other countries are
already accepting Guantánamo detainees for resettlement and will
likely continue to do so, the resettlement burdens on the
international community will not increase under the proposed
approach. Moreover, the United States takes at least some
responsibility for the problem by securing UNHCR assistance to
manage the problem in its stead, and would likely have to grant the
UNHCR additional funding to take on this additional role.233
A third possible criticism of the proposed approach regards
its potential for success. After all, the United States’ difficulty in
resettling the Uighurs has arisen primarily from the reluctance of
foreign states to anger China, a powerful state that strongly objects
to resettlement of the detainees in any third country.234 Could the
UNHCR actually resettle refugee detainees more quickly than the
United States? While UNHCR participation may not be a silver
bullet, it can only improve upon the current U.S. approach.
Moreover, even with UNHCR participation, it will still be in the
United States’ interest to close Guantánamo quickly. If U.S. political
clout is needed in addition to the UNHCR’s strengths to strong-arm a
solution or sweeten the pot for potential host countries, there will be
nothing prohibiting U.S. participation in a UNHCR-mediated
process.

V. GUANTÁNAMO AS A ROADMAP: REDEFINING THE
UNHCR’S ROLES
Part IV argued that the United States could satisfy its
objectives by invoking UNHCR assistance with the Guantánamo
refugee problem without sacrificing any important national interests,
and that this solution would improve the resettlement process for all
parties concerned. In essence, the UNHCR could help the United
States out of the double bind created by its dueling national
interests: either close Guantánamo or keep detainees off U.S. soil,

233. See Donkoh, supra note 5, at 265 (“[The] UNHCR’s role is to prompt,
facilitate, and oversee the process of State responsibility, but can never substitute
for it.”) (quoting Erika Feller, Director of UNHCR’s Department of International
Protection).
234. See Willett, supra note 21, at 1 (explaining that the United States had
not been successful in finding a resettlement state for his client because “the
shadow of the communists falls over all the capitals of Europe”).
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and either defend its right to detain or persuade foreign states to
accept detainees for resettlement. UNHCR participation would
decouple the contradictory messages that hamper U.S. progress and
promote legal, moral, and political goods sacrificed under the current
U.S. approach.
This part broadens the focus beyond Guantánamo and
considers the location of the Guantánamo problem in the global
refugee context. The proposed solution to Guantánamo’s refugee
problem involves using an existing tool, the UNHCR, in a new way.
This strategy will likely be relevant elsewhere, and may produce
systemic benefits such as shoring up refugee law and supporting the
development of international institutions.
Refugee flows have increased in size and complexity since the
Refugee Convention was adopted.235 Countries have responded with
an increasing reluctance to grant asylum to all seekers. 236 States
avoid what they see as excessive refugee claims by exploiting or
inventing loopholes to evade Refugee Convention requirements and

235. The internally displaced people, refugees, returnees, stateless people,
and asylum seekers under UNHCR supervision in 2009 amounted to a total of
34.4 million people. See UNHCR, History, supra note 185; Donkoh, supra note 5,
at 264 (noting the increase in complexity of refugee flows, consisting of refugees
in the classic sense, as well as those escaping general violence, national disasters,
and extreme poverty).
236. See Hathaway & Neve, supra note 4, at 143–44 (declaring that
“international refugee law is in crisis” and lamenting that while armed conflict
and human rights abuses continue to force individuals and groups to flee home
countries, many governments are increasingly “withdrawing from the legal duty
to provide refugees with the protection they require”); Temporary Protection,
supra note 4, at 291–92 (citing increased pressures such as the costs of status
determination and the maintenance of asylum seekers, concerns about disguised
economic migration, and the growing prevalence of organized smuggling and
domestic political pressure from anti-migrant groups). Recently, commentators
have noted that global restrictions on asylum flows come from a fear of foreigners
inspired by national security and terrorism concerns. See, e.g., Cuellar, supra
note 5, at 401 (criticizing this trend); Geo. Human Rights Inst., supra note 5, at
763 (arguing that the material support statute is indicative of this trend because,
as written, it “precludes protection for countless refugee victims of terrorist
groups”); Kapur, supra note 5, at 134 (arguing that the war on terror has inspired
a fear of the “other” in asylum policies and exploring Australia’s legal response as
an example); Donkoh, supra note 5, at 264 (arguing that a concern for national
security has led governments, particularly in “Western industrialized countries,”
to “unleash a series of stern measures and sanctions to deter and punish any type
of irregular entry”).
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diminish total numbers of refugee claims. 237 The Guantánamo
refugee crisis is, in some ways, another manifestation of this trend:
The United States, finding itself unable or unwilling to take
responsibility for the detainees under normal Refugee Convention
mechanisms, has skirted the obligations of international refugee law,
with many unfortunate consequences.
The Guantánamo situation suggests that UNHCR
participation could enable states in similar situations to satisfy
Convention requirements without sacrificing national interests. In
the Guantánamo crisis, the burden to the United States is not in the
total number of refugee claims but in the identity of the refugees.238
The United States cannot or will not afford the detainee refugees
Convention rights because the domestic political consequences of
granting asylum are too costly and the United States wants a free
hand in determining what to do with them.239 This is a context we
will likely see again. Consider the following hypotheticals:
(i) State A faces an influx of asylum-seekers of an
ethnic minority linked to terrorism or separatism
in State B. There is no reasonable basis to believe
that the asylum-seekers have any connection to
terrorist or separatist groups, or harbor militant
sentiments of any kind. Nevertheless, public
sentiment in State A is strongly against
acceptance of any refugees of that ethnic minority
due to negative stereotypes about their ethnic
237. See Hathaway & Neve, supra note 4, at 116 (arguing that governments
“proclaim a willingness to assist refugees as a matter of political discretion or
humanitarian goodwill,” but “appear committed to a pattern of defensive
strategies designed to avoid international legal responsibility” toward refugees);
Donkoh, supra note 5, at 264 (noting that states are increasingly “insisting on
their prerogative to offer asylum on their own terms, [which] rarely comply with
international law principles”). One example of this trend is a “safe third country”
agreement, where two states agree that refugees moving from one state to the
other may be immediately returned to the first. See Hathaway & Neve, supra
note 4, at 115–16; Donkoh, supra note 5, at 264. Another example is temporary
protection, a practice where states grant a displaced group entrance and refugee
status only until the group can be repatriated. See Temporary Protection, supra
note 4, at 279. A third example is an extraterritoriality exclusion. See Koh, supra
note 6, at 2408; see also Donkoh, supra note 5, at 264 (listing “negative trends in
asylum practice” such as systematic detention, expedited removal procedures,
interdiction, and forced repatriation of refugees and asylum seekers, and rigid
time limits for filing asylum applications).
238. See Worthington, supra note 1 (estimating the refugee detainee
population in Guantánamo at 34 or less).
239. See supra Part III.A.
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group. In fact, public sentiment is so strong
that it would be politically disastrous for
democratically elected leaders of State A to accept
the potential refugees.
(ii) State Y and State Z are engaged in negotiations
to conclude an important trade agreement. State
Y receives an influx of asylum-seekers who are
part of a political minority in State Z. If State Y
concludes that the asylum-seekers from State Z
are in fact refugees, it risks alienating State Z
and jeopardizing the trade negotiations.240
In the first hypothetical, State A could reject the asylumseekers while maintaining a “veneer of quasi-legal respectability”241
by asserting that they pose a national security risk, despite no
evidence of any individual connections to terrorist or separatist
groups.242 In the second, State Y could avoid the risk of irritating its
relations with State Z by rejecting State Z’s citizens on the grounds
that they do not meet the “refugee” definition. As demonstrated by
the Guantánamo context, both of these strategies have negative
consequences: Rejecting the State B asylum-seekers on national
security grounds could codify in domestic law broader national
security risk exclusion criteria. Rejecting State Z petitioners could
narrow the domestic law “refugee” definition. The implications of this
extend beyond the domestic realm by contributing to the body of
international state practice that helps define the contours of the nonrefoulement and other Refugee Convention obligations. In addition,
although State A and State Y reject the asylum-seekers on arguably
legal grounds, they violate the spirit of the law when State B and
State Z asylum-seekers are returned to persecution, and they risk
developing a negative reputation in the international community.
In both of these hypothetical situations, as in Guantánamo,
UNHCR participation in the refugee resettlement process would be
in the receiving state’s best interest. The first is closely analogous to
Guantánamo: State A could refer the State B refugees to UNHCR for
assistance with resettlement elsewhere. In the second hypothetical,
the UNHCR’s designation of the asylum-seekers as “refugees” would

240. See supra note 234 and accompanying text (describing how one state’s
grant of refugee status to another’s citizens can be an irritant to the relationship
between the two states).
241. Rendition, supra note 100, at 457.
242. See supra note 115 (defining the “national security” exclusion under the
Refugee Convention).
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carry no political message from State Y to State Z and would not
jeopardize the trade agreement.
As the two hypothetical situations show, relying on
assistance from the UNHCR in more contexts would not only assist
the states involved, but would also promote the worldwide refugee
protection system. Many current academic debates surround
strategies to accommodate the increased refugee burdens and to
prevent erosion of Refugee Convention norms. 243 Among these are
suggestions to make better use of enforcement mechanisms or
institute new ones, draft supplemental international conventions, or
recognize and regulate extra-legal approaches in a more formalized
regime.244
Turning to the UNHCR in a wider variety of contexts should
take a place among these strategies. 245 In current practice, the
243. See, e.g., James C. Hathaway et al., The Michigan Guidelines On
Protection Elsewhere, 28 Mich. J. Int’l L. 207, 210–19 (2007) [hereinafter
Michigan Guidelines] (presenting results of colloquium considering challenges to
refugee regime and presenting views); supra note 228 and accompanying text
(explaining the political challenges facing states considering resettlement of
detainees).
244. See generally Walter Kalin, Supervising the 1951 Convention on the
Status of Refugees: Article 35 and Beyond (2001) (discussing the improvement of
existing enforcement mechanisms); Temporary Protection, supra note 4
(proposing a new convention for temporary protection); Michigan Guidelines,
supra note 243 (addressing formal implementation of “protection elsewhere”
policies such as safe third country and extraterritorial processing rules); Donkoh,
supra note 5 (noting these debates).
245. This Article’s proposal is narrower than a related suggestion that the
UNHCR assume review of all instances in which a state rejects an asylum
petition or makes a final removal order. See Kidane, supra note 186, at 178–82.
Kidane argues that the UNHCR should conduct its own independent review of
the receiving state’s refugee status determination and look for an alternate state
party that might be willing to take the refugee before the removal order is
executed. Id. at 178. The UNHCR could thus facilitate the transfer of refugees to
places where they may be recognized prior to their forced repatriation. Id. at 182.
Kidane’s proposal would require a sea change in the role and function of the
UNHCR. At a minimum, executing this proposal would require some mechanism
to ensure referral of all cases to the UNHCR, which states would likely resist on
sovereignty grounds. Kidane’s proposal does not explain how this process could be
made politically palatable. There are also practical difficulties, such as the fact
that, without new sources of funding, review of every order of removal would
overload the UNHCR system. Kidane’s system would create incentives for abuse:
because the UNHCR would serve as a safety net, states could reject asylum
petitioners on improper grounds without fearing the political repercussions of a
practice of refoulement. The Guantánamo refugee situation supports a more
limited version of Kidane’s proposal, however, by suggesting that in some cases
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poorest states frequently request UNHCR assistance in order to
diminish refugee burdens, while economically advantaged states do
not. 246 At the same time, economically advantaged states control
refugee flows by exploiting real or invented Convention exceptions
and by manipulating definitions to exclude some refugees from
Convention protection. 247 Encouraging economically advantaged
states to use the UNHCR when it would be in their interests to do so
would support the development of international refugee law and
strengthen the UNHCR as an institution.
First, UNHCR management of a refugee crisis facilitates
state compliance with international refugee law, which furthers the
legitimacy and global acceptance of that law.248 In the case of the
non-refoulement principle, compliance serves to maintain
the principle’s status as jus cogens. 249 UNHCR participation also
supports the development of domestic refugee laws that express
international refugee law norms: If a state entrusts a refugee
problem to the UNHCR, it is less likely to take the approach modeled
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Sale—solving the problem by creating
narrow interpretations of the Refugee Convention or new exceptions
to it that will outlive the crisis at hand and shape domestic law for
years to come.250 UNHCR participation in managing a refugee crisis
signatory states are not willing to assume burdens under the Convention, and yet
are politically motivated to find a durable solution for asylum-seekers. In those
circumstances, UNHCR review would be both beneficial in all of the ways Kidane
proposes, and also palatable to the receiving state. Since it will be in the receiving
state’s interests to seek UNHCR assistance, the UNHCR can request funding
from that state to accomplish the necessary tasks, and no special referral
mechanism is necessary.
246. See Pallis, supra note 111, at 903–14 (explaining how the UNHCR’s role
varies across regions).
247. See Temporary Protection, supra note 4, at 287 (explaining how
developed states “weary of their obligations under refugee law” are seeking
strategies “to shift refugee protection from the realm of law to that of politics and
voluntary humanitarian assistance”); Donkoh, supra note 5, at 264 (“Western
industrialized countries” in particular have adopted restrictive policies that
“rarely comply with international law principles”).
248. The erosion of refuge law could catapult refugee protection into the
“uncertain realm of political bargaining and humanitarian assistance.”
Temporary Protection, supra note 4, at 305.
249. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 123. The UNHCR considers Sale to be a “setback to
modern international refugee law which has been developing for more than forty
years . . . [and] sets a very unfortunate example.” UNHCR Responds to U.S.
Supreme Court Decision in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 32 I.L.M. 1215, 1215
(1993). Donkoh notes that “restrictive asylum policies are easy to export and have
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ensures that the fundamental purposes of the refugee law are carried
out. As the Guantánamo refugee resettlement saga shows, when
refugees are in the hands of an unwilling state, they are at risk of
abuses such as prolonged detention without a refugee status
determination—causing uncertainty and fear—and refoulement. 251
Allowing the UNHCR to take responsibility when a state is unwilling
to do so ensures that the refugees will be afforded basic protections
and resettlement advocacy.
Second, there are multilateral benefits to a UNHCRfacilitated approach to refugee resettlement. The proposition is
somewhat counterintuitive: States seeking to avoid refugee burdens
have an opportunity to improve refugee law and policy by inviting
the UNHCR to assume responsibility. Kathleen Newland notes that,
as a historical matter, reliance by powerful states on multilateral
institutions like the UNHCR for assistance in times of crisis boosts
the legitimacy and competence of those institutions, particularly
when reliance is accompanied by increased financial assistance. 252
Newland argues that such reliance builds the knowledge and
legitimacy of those institutions because it allows them to develop
competence in new areas and to borrow political authority from the
delegating state.253 These effects endure after the immediate crisis
ends.254
Possible criticisms of this approach will largely mirror
criticisms of UNHCR participation in Guantánamo.255 One deserves
further consideration here: Does the approach carry moral risk by
encouraging states to shrug off responsibility for refugee flows they
would otherwise have managed on their own? The answer is that
a tendency to spread” and warns of a “troubling” trend: states that are just
beginning to construct refugee laws and structures are disregarding or
reinterpreting the content and scope of basic refugee law principles in ways that
Western industrialized countries have modeled. Donkoh, supra note 5, at 264–65.
251. See supra Part III.
252. See Kathleen Newland, Impact of U.S. Refugee Policies on
U.S. Foreign Policy: A Case of the Tail Wagging the Dog?,
in Threatened Peoples, Threatened Borders: World Migration & U.S. Policy
(Michael S. Teitelbaum & Myron Weiner, eds., 1995), available at www.carnegie
endowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=229.
253. Id.
254. Id. Newland also observed that “[h]anding over responsibility for
refugees to the UN agencies, the Red Cross movement, and international private
relief agencies has to some extent pushed the US government toward the
‘assertive multilateralism’ foreseen in the 1992 presidential campaign, from
which in other areas it has pulled back.” Id.
255. See supra Part IV.C.

2011]

BEYOND THE GUANTANAMO BIND

757

encouraging states to invoke the UNHCR is a better solution when
the alternative is rejection of international law responsibilities,
which leads to many negative consequences. Also, to avoid abuse, the
UNHCR could set policies to serve as safeguards. For example, the
UNHCR could demand compensation and support in exchange for
performing refugee status determinations and brokering
resettlement arrangements. If the UNHCR sets the costs high
enough, states will be deterred from abusing the system. The
UNHCR could also establish a quid pro quo system—agreeing to
accept resettlement cases from a given country only if that country
agrees to accept a given number of refugees on referral from other
countries. The UNHCR could also police the process by rejecting
particular requests for assistance if it perceives an abusive trend.
Finally, because a state’s referral of a problem to the UNHCR will in
essence constitute an acknowledgment of responsibility for that
problem, abuses should be rare. The more likely challenge will be to
persuade states to accept UNHCR assistance, rather than to deter
them from doing so to excess.

VI. CONCLUSION
One of the original purposes of the Refugee Convention was
to organize states around the common goal of refugee protection in
order to coordinate efforts so that the burdens would not fall entirely
on the shoulders of individual states. 256 Refugee mechanisms were
designed to further the national interests of state parties.257 Indeed,
256. See Donkoh, supra note 5, at 261. Donkoh argues that the refugee
protection system established by the Refuge Convention had burden-sharing
purposes at its heart:
The rationale underlying such an institutionalized,
multilateral approach, as opposed to the ad hoc initiatives
launched in previous eras to assist displaced groups, was
explained in the Preamble to the 1951 Convention, [which]
recognized that, “the grant of asylum may place an unduly
heavy burden on certain countries, and that a satisfactory
solution of a problem of which the United Nations has
recognized the international scope and nature cannot therefore
be achieved without international cooperation.”
Id.
257. Hathaway & Neve argue that refugee law was intended as a “politically
and socially acceptable way to maximize border control.” Hathaway & Neve,
supra note 4, at 116. The goal of refugee law is not to enforce human rights
norms, but to serve as a functional mechanism to assist states in managing the
problem of refugees. See id. (explaining that refugee law is “a mechanism by
which governments agree to compromise their sovereign right to independent
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the preamble to the Refugee Convention recognized that to avoid
“unduly heavy burdens” on any state, the refugee problem could be
solved with international cooperation.258 By failing to make use of the
institution designed to facilitate such international cooperation, the
United States chooses to shoulder alone an unnecessarily heavy
burden. The consequences are unfortunate for everyone, especially
for the refugee detainees who languish in Guantánamo. Rather than
dispensing
with
international
refugee
mechanisms,
the
better solution is to revitalize them.259 By inviting the UNHCR to
Guantánamo, the United States could point the way.

action in order to manage complexity, contain conflict, promote decency, or avoid
catastrophe”).
258. Id. at 169 n.245.
259. Cf. id. at 116 (stating that refugee law is disfavored and under threat
because its mechanisms no longer achieve its “fundamental purpose,” which is to
balance the rights of involuntary migrants and those of the states to which they
flee).

